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Abstract 
 We are currently living in what has been dubbed “a secular age.” Religious 
affiliation has gone down, leading to a phenomenon in the West known as “the rise of the 
Nones.” At the same time, from the time of the Gospels, the Church understands herself 
to be charged by Jesus Christ with the obligation to “make disciples of all nations” (Mt. 
28:19). Recent popes have likewise affirmed that we are obliged to go out and propose 
faith in Jesus to the world. Beginning with John Paul II, a “new evangelization” has been 
proposed, where the Church evangelizes and makes disciples in places where Christian 
belief once was common, but has now waned. This work seeks first of all to advance the 
project of the New Evangelization. 
 Evangelization cannot happen in a vacuum, however, and we must be mindful of 
what people find credible. Just as Jesus did not berate Thomas for his doubt, but rather 
gave Thomas what he needed for belief, so too the Church cannot merely berate the 
modern world for unbelief, but give it what it needs for belief. Thus, it is necessary that 
we first ask what people need to believe in general. In the first chapter, drawing heavily 
from Charles Taylor’s work A Secular Age, we will get a feel for the conditions of belief 
in the contemporary world, and then flesh out our notions by drawing upon various 
sociological and historical studies of current unbelief, especially Cristal Manning’s book 
Losing our Religion. 
 In the second chapter, we once again begin with Taylor, focusing on the excarnate 
trend in knowing, where starting in the Enlightenment our senses, feelings, and 
experiences were obstacles to knowing. We will then contrast this with the approach of 
19th century British thinker John Henry Newman, whose work Grammar of Assent sought 
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to push back against these excarnating trends, especially in the concept of the Illative 
Sense that he developed in the book.  
 Finally, we will explore how Newman’s Personalism—his grasp of the dignity of 
the whole person—can be seen in how he proposes Christianity for belief to others. 
Newman prioritizes reality over ideas, and so will stress Biblical images, saints, 
sacraments, liturgy, and history—all as a way of gaining an image of the person of Jesus. 
From these images and experiences had by the whole person, we may propose 
Christianity in a credible manner, and the Church may continue to be faithful to her 





























 By nearly any standard, atheism and non-belief are on the rise.1 Sociologist of 
Religion Jerome Baggett has noted that, with a proliferation of atheism, there is likewise 
a proliferation of atheist organizations.2 Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has written 
an entire book, aptly titled A Secular Age, seeking to answer the question, “why was it 
virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 
2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?”3 Books of all sorts have 
sprung up on the question of non-belief. Most famous among these would have to be 
those written by the “Four Horsemen” of the New Atheism: Richard Dawkins, 
Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett.  
With religious non-affiliation of all stripes having gone on long enough that there 
are now multiple generations, books on unaffiliated parents are now coming out, such as 
Christel Manning’s Losing Our Religion. Books like this are also significant because they 
defy the conventional wisdom that lack of religious practice or affiliation is a youthful 
experiment, but that once the prospect of raising a family became real, one would turn 
back to religion.4 Some of the people Manning interviews in her study do indeed return to 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Pew’s “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015, which documents a 
6.7% increase from 2007 to 2014 in the number of people who were religiously unaffiliated in the United 
States. Accessed March 15, 2018, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-
landscape/ 
2 Cf. Jerome Baggett, The Varieties of Irreligious Experience: How American Atheists Live 
(and Thrive) in a Religious Culture (New York: NYU Press, forthcoming), 4 
3 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 25 
4 Manning discusses this phenomenon is chapter three of Losing our Religion: How Unaffiliated Parents 
are Raising their Children, (New York: New York University Press, 2015), noting that “Surveys conducted 
in the twentieth century, prior to the recent upsurge in Nones, have consistently shown a life cycle pattern 
in religious affiliation: young adults disaffiliated with the religion they were raised with and later 
reaffiliating when they marry and have children.” (p. 54) She goes on to observe that while this held 
relatively true with the “baby boomer” generation, “the pattern is weaker today.” (ibid.) 
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their religious roots (or find new ones), but plenty of others do not. Baggett notes that 
groups like Camp Quest, which seeks to cultivate values of secular humanism in the 
children who attend. Groups like these arguably provide the structure and the 
transmission of values which were once the sole purview of religious groups. Religion no 
longer has the market cornered. We can no longer expect that people will come to the 
Church for its “pearl of great price”—the Church must go to them if it wishes to share the 
Good News that it has. 
Seeing this reality is precisely what inspired St. John Paul II to urge a “new 
evangelization.” He used this phrase on a number of occasions, but perhaps most clearly 
in his encyclical Redemptoris Missio, where he wrote that there are “countries with 
ancient Christian roots, and occasionally in the younger Churches as well, where entire 
groups of the baptized have lost a living sense of the faith, or even no longer consider 
themselves members of the Church” and that, in these situations, “what is needed is a 
‘new evangelization’ or a ‘re-evangelization.’”5 John Paul II’s call has been taken up by 
hierarchy and laity alike, and re-emphasized by both of his successors. Pope Francis 
stressed the importance of the New Evangelization in his apostolic exhortation Evangelii 
Gaudium, quoting John Paul II’s words and then declaring, “What would happen if we 
were to take these words seriously? We would realize that missionary outreach is 
paradigmatic for all the Church’s activity.”6 Re-evangelizing the post-Christian West is 
                                                 
5 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Redemptoris Missio, On the Permanent Validity of the Church’s 
Missionary Mandate, (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1990), no. 33. Accessed March 16, 2018, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-
missio.html  
6 Francis, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, On the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World, 
Vatican Website, no. 15. (emphasis original) Accessed April 21, 2018, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-
ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html It is perhaps worth noting that this exhortation is the fruit of a synod 
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not simply something the Church does in order to have a higher membership roll. It is 
something it does because Christians have been commanded by Christ to “go out to the 
whole world and make disciples of all nations” (Mt. 28:19). As Vatican II declares, “the 
Pilgrim Church is missionary by her very nature.”7 We are obliged to go and welcome as 
many as we can into fellowship with Jesus. 
If we are to go out and welcome others, it may be helpful first to see what they 
would find welcoming. This does not mean that we must change the substance of our 
faith, but a good host is attentive to how to make a guest feel at home. Here, Charles 
Taylor may be helpful, as he sketches out the sort of world people today are at home in. 
Taylor’s A Secular Age provides a helpful alternative to a strict “history of ideas.” 
While such histories certainly have a value, and it is good to see how one idea emerges 
from another, Taylor’s approach helps us to see not just the genealogy of an idea, but 
how it caught on. This is partly because of what Taylor calls a “social imaginary”—ways 
that we imagine society, the world, and our place in each. Ways of acting and ways of 
thinking mutually reinforce one another, and a shift in one makes plausible a shift in the 
other. For instance, Taylor notes that as economic experience shifts (and an economy 
becomes seen as something that can be shaped), the Lockean way of conceiving 
Providence becomes more acceptable, so that “God’s design is one of interlocking 
causes, not of harmonized meanings.”8 People in different eras are more disposed to 
                                                 
of bishops which Francis called in order to discuss the New Evangelization, further emphasizing the 
importance he gives it 
7 Vatican II, decree Ad Gentes, On the Missionary Nature of the Church, (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 1965), no. 2. Accessed April 5, 2018, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651207_ad-
gentes_en.html. The document then cites Matthew 28:19 and the equivalent text in Mark 16:15ff to note 
“the duty that lies on the Church of spreading the faith and salvation of Christ.” (no. 5) 
8 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 177 
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some kinds of truths than others, or some ways of presenting the truth than others, and so 
if we wish to preach truth in a way that it can be received, we would do well to be 
attentive to such matters.  
As Taylor looks at the present age, what he dubs the “age of authenticity,” he sees 
at the heart of the age “a wider critique of the buffered, disciplined self, concerned above 
all with rational impulse control.”9 The age draws inspiration from the emphasis on 
emotive self-expression from the Romantic period—we may think of how in Dead Poets’ 
Society, Robin Williams’ character taught his students to rebel against 1950’s conformity 
by exposing them to the Romantic and Transcendentalist poets. There has also been “the 
growth of a rich vocabulary of interiority, an inner realm of thought and feeling to be 
explored. […] we now conceive of ourselves as having inner depths.”10 The enchantment 
which we formerly attributed to the cosmos we now bestow upon the psyche. This new 
enchantment leads to an equivalent reverence. While before there was a hushed solemnity 
surrounding certain times, places, or objects, now we have reverence for the psyche, and 
not upsetting the order of it. It must be allowed to express itself.  
The age of authenticity is an age which seeks depth (perhaps to varying degrees of 
success). This changes the conditions of belief across the board. Not only will people not 
hold religious beliefs because something fails to resonate with them, but those who do 
believe do so because they do find an inner agreement between the belief and themselves. 
We may think of how people feel free to dissent from teachings of the magisterium on the 
basis of conscience to see an example of this at work.11 Robert Bolt, a playwright who 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 476 
10 Ibid., 539-540 
11 My claim at present is not that people are right or wrong in dissent on the basis of conscience, which 
would be beyond the scope of the present work. My claim is merely that this dissent on these grounds does 
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repeatedly explored issues of the individual conscience in the face of large-scale 
opposition, gave voice to this mindset in his classic work A Man for All Seasons, when 
Sir Thomas More declares to Norfolk “what matters to me is not whether it is true or not, 
but that I believe it to be true—or rather not that I believe it, but that I believe it.”12 
Personal assent is the supreme law of belief.  
Taylor sees going along with the emphasis on personal assent an emphasis on 
personal responsibility for knowledge, and a narrative of courage in accepting the results 
of the search for knowledge. Among the more famous advocates of this view is Kant, 
who characterized the spirit of Enlightenment with the slogan sapere aude! (Dare to 
know!) As Taylor observes, “growth of knowledge was essential to come to this stage, 
but this was inseparable from a new form of courage, which allows us to take 
responsibility for our own take on reality and our place in it.”13 Kant proclaimed a 
“Copernican revolution” of knowledge. While for a Medieval like Aquinas, truth was 
defined by a fitting of the mind to the thing, Kant now proclaims that truth is defined by 
fitting the thing into the mind.14 The mind works to assimilate reality into its pre-set 
categories. Knowledge is now a much more active process than previously envisioned. 
As a result, the person must be active, not passive, in coming to know. Kant envisioned 
                                                 
in fact occur, that little to no guilt is felt in the dissent (many would claim that if anything should change, it 
is the institution being dissented against), and that this phenomenon is indicative of present conditions for 
religious belief in the West.  
12 Robert Bolt, A Man for all Seasons: A Play in Two Acts (London: Samuel French, 1960), 49 (emphasis 
original). It should be noted that this is not a quote from the historical Thomas More, but does reflect the 
views of Bolt 
13 Taylor, A Secular Age, 575 
14 Aquinas’s views on truth may be found in Questiones Disputatae de Veritate: Questions 1-9, tr. Robert. 
W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regenry Company, 1952), I.i, especially in his Respondeo. Kant 
describes his “Copernican revolution” approach in the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure 
Reason 
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the virtue of courage as being necessary to this process. People may have to travel a long 
and lonely road in order to come to knowledge.  
As Taylor observes the various facets of the Age of Authenticity, one particular 
feature he sees is the “spirituality of quest.”15 This spirituality emerges out of “moving 
steadily over half a millennium towards more personal, committed forms of religious 
devotion and practice.”16 With Vatican II, we see an admonition that “pastors of souls 
must […] ensure that the faithful take part fully aware of what they are doing, actively 
engaged in the rite, and enriched by its effects.”17 I cannot simply go through the 
motions—I must be fully aware, I must be engaged, I must be enriched. It is worth noting 
that when Vatican II laid out this requirement, it also specifically noted that “something 
more is required than mere observation of the laws concerning valid and licit 
celebration.”18 We can no longer simply say “the baptism was valid, Johnny is saved.” 
The sacrament must now bear palpable fruit. If I am going to be in a position to know 
fully what is going on, and really appreciate it, I need to prepare myself. Thus people in 
the current age are drawn to pilgrimages such as World Youth Day, “which wrench us 
out of the everyday, and put us in contact with something beyond ourselves.”19 These 
“wrenching” moments give us experiences that we can associate with religious practices, 
and so feel enriched. Thus Taylor notes that daily religious practice is more likely to be a 
result of pilgrimage than its cause—an inversion from the pattern that existed 500 years 
ago. The Age of Authenticity is an age of searching. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 532 
16 Ibid.  
17 Vatican II, Sacrosanctum Concilium, no. 11. Accessed March 10, 2017, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html 
18 Ibid.  
19 Taylor, A Secular Age, 516-517 
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 In the searching we have seen, the figure of Cardinal Newman may be a helpful 
figure. If Augustine’s Confessions was the story of a restless heart, Newman’s Apologia 
was the story of a restless mind—though a mind engaged with a heart. Like Augustine, 
Newman wants rest, and therefore he wants certitude. His Grammar of Assent is a study 
of that. Newman was searching for certitude throughout the period he recounts in his 
Apologia. By the time of the Grammar of Assent, he holds that without real assent—
which is at the heart of certitude—“in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field 
of notions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, 
and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or 
religion.”20 Philosopher John F. Crosby has written that Newman’s real assent and 
apprehension “is experienced as the work of the whole human being,” and sees in 
Newman’s real assent a forerunner to the Personalism that would come to flourish 
starting in the mid-20th century. By Personalism, we mean a stance that recognizes each 
human person “as subject, not just as object […] as someone, not just as something.”21 
Because of the interior dimension of the person that goes along with the outer, objective 
dimension, there is a unique and unrepeatable element to each human person. Real assent 
engages the whole person, and so helps bring certitude and rootedness to the whole 
person.  
                                                 
20 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, ed. with notes by Ian Ker (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 88. (n.b. Ker provides the pagination of the 8 th edition of 1889, the last 
published in Newman’s life, in the margins. For ease of reference, we will use that pagination, rather than 
the actual pagination of Ker’s critical edition) 
21 John F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Henry Newman (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2014), xx. We should note here that Personalism may also deal with higher levels of 
personal being (i.e., angels and God), as with W. Norris Clarke on Person and Being (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press), 33. However, Personalism does not require a belief in angels, or even God.  
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Newman’s desire to provide moorings and roots can speak to the current era. Baggett 
notes that “[attempts] to root the self within a meaningful past or future have become 
especially critical in light of the seeming rootlessness of modern life.”22 This is not to say 
that Newman will close off future thoughts or explorations. Newman has no such interest. 
But he does provide moorings and a harbor that we can be certain of as we move out to 
explore more and more of reality, and in this he may have common cause with people 
today.  
Because of this common cause, Newman is an ideal figure for us to draw from as 
we seek to articulate the Catholic faith to contemporary individuals in the New 
Evangelization. More specifically, because of his Personalist tendencies, Newman’s 
theological epistemology offers a valuable resource to articulate Christian belief in a 
credible manner to contemporary individuals. Especially in A Secular Age, Taylor 
identifies a number of conditions of belief that exist in the current era, and Newman can 
help us show how Catholicism can work in these conditions to speak in a credible way.  
Our plan of proceeding will be as follows: in the first chapter, we will simply get a 
deeper sense of the current era. We will look at the conditions of belief in the Age of 
Authenticity, drawing primarily from Taylor’s observations, sketching them out in light 
of the characteristics of the age we have presented already. To give these characteristics 
flesh, towards the end of the chapter we will draw upon several works, especially 
Manning’s Losing Our Religion, to make sure that we truly understand those we seek to 
evangelize. In the second chapter, we will focus on a particular strand in Taylor’s account 
of secularization—the tendency towards excarnation, especially in how we come to 
                                                 
22 Jerome Baggett, Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 64.  
  9   
 
know—and then contrast this with Newman’s incarnate way of knowing. In this, we will 
see Newman give a fuller (and more appealing) way of knowing, and one that can give us 
further guidance as we seek to present Catholicism in a way that others can know and 
believe. In the third chapter, we will further explore Newman’s Personalist turn, and see 
ways in which this allows him to address the concerns of the contemporary era. Finally, 
in the conclusion, we will briefly sketch out ways to evangelize in light of Newman. 
Ultimately, our work seeks to help the Church in its work of evangelization and equip 
ministers of the gospel (both ordained and lay) to reach the hearts of contemporary 































Chapter One: The Heart of the Secular Age 
I. CONDITIONS OF COMTEMPORARY BELIEF 
 Evangelization cannot simply be a battle of ideas. Examining Newman’s motto as 
a cardinal, cor ad cor loquitur (“heart speaks to heart”), Crosby notes that with this, 
“Newman means that he does not want to speak only out of his intellect or address people 
only intellectually.”23 Certainly, Newman was adept at intellectual discourse, but he also 
recognized that there was a deeper level that needed to be engaged beyond what is 
explicitly enunciated. If we are to apply Newman’s thought to the present day, we must 
first gain a sense not only of the ideas which are espoused in this Age of Authenticity, but 
the social imaginary which makes these ideas plausible. For the moment, if heart is truly 
to speak to heart, in the spirit of Newman we must first simply get to know the heart with 
which we wish to speak.  
 In understanding the conditions of belief in the unbeliever, we are likewise 
understanding the conditions of belief within ourselves. These conditions, Taylor claims, 
apply to all individuals. Philosopher James K.A. Smith wrote How (Not) to Be Secular as 
“a field guide” to Taylor’s “much larger tome.”24 Smith sees Taylor’s secular age and 
notes that even with religious believers like himself, “we don’t believe instead of 
doubting, we believe while doubting. We’re all Thomas now.”25 To some extent, this may 
be regarded as dramatic flourish. But even if one comes to rest in certitude regarding 
                                                 
23 John F. Crosby, The Personalism of John Henry Newman (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2014), 66 
24 James James K.A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014), viii 
25 Ibid., 4 
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belief, Newman also holds that certitude (unlike simple assent) is reflective. Reflecting 
on the various options, and thus coming to certitude, looks different in the years 2000 and 
1500. Unbelief in the West is a live option, one which the assenting mind must pass 
through in order to come to certitude.26 In a very real way, therefore, to describe the heart 
of the non-believer is also to describe the heart of the believer. So we turn not only to the 
ideas which are currently being debated, but to the hearts and minds which hold them. 
 People today are searching. This searching might lead to traditional religion, but 
not necessarily. So what would lead an individual to believe in a given religion? For that, 
we should ask how and why we believe today. First of all, belief is personal. By this, we 
mean that the individual sees belief as the result of his or her own agency, rather than 
satisfying the needs or request of a community. Taylor notes that this is partly a reaction 
against the “one-sided pre-eminence of reason” that is not quite describing the whole 
person.27 Feeling and bodily goodness are absent. As a result, any rational account on the 
current model for why one ought to believe in or do something is likely to seem like it is 
missing something. With a dissatisfaction with “our current definitions of social and 
individual success” and accounts of fullness, a search for new definitions occurs. If the 
social order is seen as part of the cause of dissatisfaction, then the social order will be 
disregarded in this search for fullness, and so the quest becomes “a personal search, and 
can easily be coded in the language of authenticity: I am trying to find my path, or find 
                                                 
26 Cf. Taylor, A Secular Age, 3 
27 Taylor, A Secular Age, 507 
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myself.”28 One’s own self may be the only trustworthy guide to fullness, and so fullness 
and self-discovery are linked. 
 Partly because belief is something taken on by the individual, but partly also 
because of the larger spirituality of quest, a further condition of belief is that it be open-
ended. By this, we mean that beliefs that seem to close down avenues of exploration are 
more likely to be rejected, while those that open up further questions are more likely to 
be accepted. There is a conviction that belief should not be exclusive—either of other 
persons or of other ideas. Definitive answers or propositions tend to run afoul of this 
conviction. Taylor notes that the modern spiritual life is “a quest which can’t start with a 
priori exclusions or inescapable starting points, which could pre-empt this experience.”29 
Quest itself does not demand that there be no “inescapable starting points,” but because 
authenticity chafes at anything which narrows personal experience, these set points are 
likewise balked at. The form of reasoning which leaves out so much of personal 
experience would likewise leave too much out from any quest.  
When Augustine wrote his Confessions, introspection of that level was relatively 
uncommon in Western literature. Now, the introspective autobiography is a genre unto 
itself. In mental health, there is a growing trend of seeing the self not only as a thing with 
depth, but potentially limitless depth. Humanistic Psychologist Donald Polkinghorne 
holds that what stifles the self are “conceptual schemes” that “lead people to understand 
their selves as static and unchangeable things.”30 However, “if one’s conceptual schemes 
                                                 
28 Ibid. We should note that Taylor defines authenticity on page 299 of A Secular Age as “expressive 
individualism, in which people are encouraged to find their own way, discover their own fulfillment, ‘do 
their own thing.’” For our purposes, that is basically the definition we will be using here. 
29 Taylor, A Secular Age, 508 
30 Donald E. Polkinghorne, “The Self and Humanistic Psychology,” in The Handbook of Humanistic 
Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research, and Practice, ed. Kirk J. Schneider, James F.T. Bugental, 
and J. Frasier Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 83. Here, Polkinghorne is following 
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are open enough, then they can allow the real self beneath the distorting understandings 
to be directly felt.”31 The key in this view is for ideas to be sufficiently “open” and not to 
conceive of the self or reality as something static. The feel of something definitive or 
unchanging can be perceived as stifling or suffocating. Because we perceive depth which 
cannot be adequately captured by current schemes, for these to be plausible, they need to 
acknowledge their limitations. While what we have said has mostly applied to the inner 
world, it applies just as easily to more cosmic questions such as religion.  Reality is not 
being adequately captured by the Modern conception of reason and the principles it 
enumerates.  
Just as something tends to be believed today if the concept is open-ended, so too it 
is more believable if it acknowledges reality to be multi-faceted. These two conditions are 
in many ways two sides of one coin. If we acknowledge the limitations of our own 
conceptual schemes, then we are going to allow that multiple conceptual schemes may be 
valid paths to reality. The psychologist David Elkins, for instance, notes that within 
psychology “the humanistic movement has provided an open arena for discussions about 
spirituality, refusing to institutionalize any particular points of view,” and further holds 
that “this open attitude is one of the movement’s greatest contributions to the study of 
spirituality.”32 Spirituality and religious searching are universal phenomena, and so many 
(and perhaps any) views of spirituality and religion are accepted. From an institutional 
point of view, we might say that the humanistic psychology movement has a multi-
                                                 
psychologist Carl Rogers, who saw therapy as a way to create a space for the patients to communicate who 
they truly are, and thus integrate themselves. Today, there is an entire field of “Rogerian” psychotherapy 
which uses Rogers’ theories.  
31 Ibid., 84 
32 David N. Elkins, “Beyond Religion: Toward a Humanistic Spirituality,” in The Handbook of Humanistic 
Psychology, 201 
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faceted approach to spirituality, and that its spirituality itself is multi-faceted—bringing 
together multiple approaches and giving them roughly equal weight.33  
II. THE IMMANENT FRAME OF BELIEF 
Taylor places the conditions of belief within the constellation of a larger 
Immanent Frame. This framework is how we tend to experience and assess reality. 
Anything that is believed is believed more or less through this framework. Thus, we 
should turn our attention to the Immanent Frame of the age and its makeup—particularly 
the disenchanted world, the buffered self, and its individualism. Taylor saw the Immanent 
Frame as highly bound up with disenchantment, perhaps its most important facet. Taylor 
is clear that while a “common ‘subtraction’ story attributes everything to 
disenchantment,” this leaves out crucial details.34 For one thing, he notes that 
disenchantment was not exclusively the purview of scientists, but that Christian clergy 
sometimes had motives for disenchantment as well—in arguments against superstition, 
for instance. Moreover, disenchantment is not simply a mechanization of the world 
around us, though that is part of it. As Smith observes, “Taylor’s account of 
disenchantment has a different accent, suggesting that this is primarily a shift in the 
location of meaning.”35 Rather than significance being found in the thing itself, it is 
found in our understanding of the thing. As this shift in location happens, other shifts 
occur along with it.  
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The first shift, that of the order of the world, may be thought of as the shift from 
“cosmos” to “universe.” The cosmos “testified to divine purpose and action.”36 Beyond 
the order of the cosmos testifying to an orderer, there was also the fact that certain events 
were seen as being caused by God, or at the very least by some higher spiritual being 
(such as some of the demons Jesus cast out in the New Testament which caused 
infirmities such as epilepsy). We see this in various ways. While there were once 
particular places that one made pilgrimage to or times that one prayed, such particulars 
have become less and less important. Monday is just as good a day to pray for one’s dead 
relatives as Tuesday, even if Tuesday is All Saint’s Day. Taylor is very careful here not 
to place the whole responsibility at the feet of science, though scientists do make up part 
of the story. Instead, much of the engine of change has been the increasingly disciplined 
notion of the self, the view of time as “a precious resource, not to be ‘wasted,’” and the 
desire to make the most of time.37 We did not get smarter or more enlightened about what 
makes up a day or a year—we got more utilitarian.  
Along with a utilitarian notion of time and place comes a utilitarian notion of 
existence. As Taylor notes, the pre-modern conception of the cosmos involves “a 
hierarchy of being,” which “points to eternity as the locus of its principle of cohesion.”38 
Some forms of existence are nobler than others—especially those which are more tightly 
organized. Rocks or sand, for instance, are merely “heaps” for Aristotle. But a tree has 
more parts and order, and an animal even more parts and order than that. For pre-
moderns such as Aristotle, but moreso for Christians such as Augustine or Aquinas, 
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humans occupy a unique place in the visible order, as intellectual beings who are self-
directing and able to contemplate unchanging truths.39 Above this are celestial beings and 
God—multiple levels of existence in a “great chain” or “great circle” of being.40 Now, 
being is flattened, and the order of things is expressed in “exceptionless natural laws.”41 
The hierarchy is gone, and all are equal—distinguished only by their use or assigned 
value.  
With the loss of metaphysical hierarchy comes the loss of social hierarchy. Here 
is the second shift that Taylor sees—the shift from polis to society. The fabric of human 
communities in this view was divinely ordained. We see something of this in 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth. When Macbeth kills Duncan, there is a triple violation of 
nature—the kinsman kills his kin, the host murders his guest, and the subject slays his 
king. This grave subversion of the natural order ripples out into the rest of the world. An 
owl killed a falcon, and Duncan’s horses ate each other. Worst of all (but unknown to all 
but Macbeth and his wife), just after Macbeth murders Duncan, a steward wakes up and 
asks for Macbeth’s blessing, but Macbeth finds he cannot say the word “amen.” He 
wonders after “wherefore could not I pronounce 'Amen'?/ I had most need of blessing, 
and 'Amen'/ Stuck in my throat.”42 The order of nature is so violated that he physically 
cannot even lift his voice in prayer. To kill a ruler (or, as we would say now, a leader—a 
shift equal to the move from cosmos to universe) in the modern era would still be grave, 
but the only crime beyond the murder of any other human is merely because it upsets the 
                                                 
39 See, for instance, City of God XIX.12-13 (describing the peace which all things are ordered to) or Summa 
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40 W. Norris Clarke describes the “Great Circle of Being” well in The One and the Many: A Contemporary 
Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), esp. pp. 305-307 
41 Ibid., 60 
42 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, scene ii, lines 42-44 
  17   
 
proper routine of governance. To commit regicide for Shakespeare is to do violence 
against the embodiment of the body politic. As with the shift from cosmos to universe, 
we have a general flattening of community. Rather than a mountain which points 
upward—perhaps all the way up to heaven—we have a great flat field. Our eyes may go 
to the horizon, but our vision is firmly horizontal. Only outwards, never upwards. 
The first two shifts deal with the outer world. But in shifting to a world that has 
no particular order we fit into, and that we might even re-order based on our own desires, 
we likewise see an inner shift: the rise of what Taylor calls the “buffered self,” in contrast 
to the porous self. The porous self is embedded into the larger fabric of the cosmos, and 
is generally at the mercy of this fabric. The buffered self is able to take a clinical distance 
from anything in the universe. Something like “the power of positive thinking” makes no 
sense for a porous self. Forces both malignant and benevolent stand ready to impact you, 
whether you are in a positive frame of mind or not. Other people have power over you 
whether you have a good self-esteem or not. These are simply metaphysical realities. 
Only in the utilitarian shift, where things have the value I give them, and objects have no 
purpose beyond what I can use them for, can the buffered self arise.  
Taylor sees the buffered self as the inner side of disenchantment because when “it 
comes to seen axiomatic that all thought, feeling and purpose, all the features we 
normally can ascribe to agents, must be in minds” then we begin “to find the idea of 
spirits, moral forces, causal powers with a purposive bent, close to incomprehensible.”43 
The concept of the buffered self has given rise to a variety of terms and expectations. If 
we are convinced that there is no origin for our success or failure beyond our own 
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thoughts and inner status, we are going to be much more attentive to this status. Thus we 
have what Taylor calls the “disciplined self”—the desire to maintain proper self-control, 
“particularly in the areas of sex and anger.”44 Emerson in particular shows this tendency, 
declaring that “whoso would be a man would be a non-conformist.”45 His entire essay on 
self-reliance is a paean to taking mastery of one’s inner world and standing apart from 
outside influences. True adulthood is learning to rise above all influences, and deigning 
to be influenced only insofar as it pleases you. We may think also of the child’s rhyme 
“sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” In this simple 
phrase, we see a declaration that the only power another has over one’s own self is the 
power allowed by one’s own self. Children on the playground are saying a rhyme that 
could only be true for a buffered self.  
Along with a new emphasis on self-control, the buffered self also has a new 
“intimacy/distance” distinction.46 This stands in contrast to an era of more “promiscuous 
contact,” where nobles and common retainers were in constant, often unregulated, contact 
with one another. When St. Ignatius of Loyola was starting the Jesuits, he and the other 
first Jesuits decided that they would go directly to the pope and seek direction from him 
on how they might best serve the Church. It would be almost laughable now for a group 
of nine people with few accomplishments and little power to go to a capital city and 
expect to meet with a world leader shortly thereafter. Even the most populist of leaders is 
generally well-insulated from the rest of the people. We spend our time and share our 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 540 
45 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in Essays by Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Edna H.L. Turpin (New 
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thoughts only with a select few others. We wish to control our social fabric, and in a 
sense construct our communities.  
Groups, on this view, are constructed, not inherited. This is also important 
because our roles and identities within these groups are therefore constructed, not 
inherited. Moreover, my good (defined as I see fit) is not necessarily linked to the group’s 
good. Aristotle would struggle to describe a good human without also describing whether 
this human is a good parent, a good community member (citizen or otherwise), a good 
butcher, baker, or candlestick maker. Having the qualities to fulfill one’s roles was part of 
what made one good. With the buffered self, goodness has no necessary reference to a 
larger social order. Aristotle declared that “he who is unable to live in society, or who has 
no need because he is sufficient for himself, must either be a beast or a god.”47 The 
human was a “political animal” in the same way a fish was an aquatic animal—outside of 
their respective mediums (polis or water), the animal will die. For Emerson and others 
who laud the buffered self, flourishing outside the community is a sign of true greatness.  
As Taylor notes, this new separation of self from community follows upon “the 
atrophy of earlier ideas of a cosmic order.”48 Lacking this conception of cosmic order, we 
have the final facet of the Immanent frame: its individualism. With the shift from a 
metaphysical reality to a utilitarian one, society has no intrinsic value. It is what you wish 
it to be, and it does to you what you wish it to do to you. There was an inherent purpose 
to society and an inherent purpose to human life, and the two were inseparably mixed. 
But without inherent purpose—telos, as the ancients would say—there is no inherent 
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mixture of personal and social. It is this lack of inherent mixture of personal and social 
that defines individualism. They do often mix, and the mixture is usually seen as 
beneficial, but it is not seen as necessary or inherent in the nature of anything. The 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre wrote After Virtue, where he examines contemporary 
ethics. In this book, he compares ideas of justice held by both Rawls (a classical liberal 
position) and Nozick (a libertarian position) and notes that in both cases it is “as though 
we had been shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with a group of other individuals, 
each of whom is a stranger to me and to all the others.”49 While classical conceptions of 
justice generally would not make sense outside of a community, modern conceptions 
involve individuals—either one at a time, or taken as a bundle—but always individuals. 
As with other shifts into the modern age, Taylor identifies one of the engines moving us 
towards individualism to include Catholicism—in encouraging practices such as private 
confession, people see their responsibility for an action apart from any communal guilt or 
honor.  
This is the framework of the current age—disenchanted, with buffered selves 
leading individual lives. For something to be believed, it must resonate with a person—
“trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.”50 It must strike a person in a total 
way, it must present itself as having depth (usually known by being open-ended), and it 
must allow for a multi-faceted reality. Taylor notes that there are dilemmas and cross-
pressures for all concerned. Believers and nonbelievers alike must acknowledge that a 
variety of positions beyond their own are at least plausible. Believers, of course, are made 
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more aware of their perilous situation by the presence of nonbelievers. Unbelief becomes 
a plausible option. Because of how the world and our experience of the world is now set 
up, we now have “the possibility of exclusive humanism as a viable social imaginary.”51 
In other words, it is now possible on a wide scale to imagine what fulfilment might look 
like without God. Historian James Turner’s book Without God, Without Creed, explores 
how nonbelief arose in the United States, and shows us that social imaginary at work. 
Turner notes that in the 1800s, “[something] very like a Religion of Culture flourished in 
the latter part of the century,” with “museums and concert-halls” serving as “temples of 
culture.”52 This reverence was especially pronounced among Agnostics, since “[lacking] 
the Holy Spirit, they needed all the more the human spirit, idealized in art.”53 Where holy 
icons might show Christians images of saints as something to strive for, great paintings 
now lionize human existence and show us what we may become. In both cases, beauty is 
meant to inspire humans to something great. This again underscores Taylor’s point that 
non-belief is not a subtraction (belief was an optional extra that was later sloughed off) 
but a shift (belief became one option for fulfillment among several).  
Taylor also notes that within the Immanent Frame, nonbelievers can find 
themselves in moments of fullness which make them more open to theism, or perhaps 
even have what Taylor calls a “Peggy Lee” moment, referring to the song where she asks 
“Is that all there is?” There is a “hope for wholeness and the rescue of the body” that 
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Taylor sees underlying much conflict between religion and secularity (as each offers their 
version of how to get these things), but there is no clear victor.54 
 The cross-pressures that drive these dilemmas for Taylor all revolve around 
questions of agency, ethics, and aesthetics—the sense that we have control over our 
actions, the question of why we act as we do (or should), and the question of why 
experiences of nature and beauty move us. Ultimately, the question is “what real fullness 
consists in”—or, as Aristotle would put it, it is a debate over telos.55 Within this debate 
are a number of “spiritual hungers and tensions” which arise in the current era.56 
 Among the greatest problems that the desire for meaning is wrestling with is the 
problem of evil—which Taylor distinguishes from theodicy, as nonbelievers likewise 
struggle with this issue. There is still suffering, there is still struggle, there is still 
hardship. Even if we do not cause another’s suffering directly (and we very often do), we 
may still take pleasure in their pain. The believer must square this with the existence of 
God. The nonbeliever must square this with the non-existence of any place better. You 
either have the charge that your deity could make things better but doesn’t, or feel the 
malaise that the world you are living in is as good as it gets. This is the struggle with evil 
in the Immanent Frame.  
 Among the other dilemmas is “how to understand powerful desires, sometimes 
even to the point of frenzy: wild sexuality, berserker rage, love of battle, slaughter?”57 As 
much as we assert that we can overcome ourselves and train in virtue, we still have 
impulses that eclipse reason—some of which are rather dark. Not only do we have dark 
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impulses, we can feel great rushes of euphoria from acting on these impulses—as secular 
as our age might be, the term “forbidden fruit” has stuck around for a very good reason. 
Augustine struggled with the thrill he got from stealing pears as a teenager. As much as 
we may scoff at his confusion, the song “Folsom Prison Blues,” with its line “I shot a 
man in Reno just to watch him die” remains a much-listened to classic. We still must deal 
with our darker sides in the modern age, and so “we swap submission to the priest for 
submission to the therapist.”58 Whichever one you go with, you must still make a choice 
as you face the darkness. 
III. FLESHING OUT THE FRAME 
 We see the world that nonbelievers inhabit, but just who are these nonbelievers?  
Christel Manning’s recent work Losing our Religion, which surveys parents who identify 
as “Nones” in some way and explores how they parent, and Baggett’s forthcoming 
Varieties of Nonreligious Experience may be of some help here as we strive to know 
these individuals. Baggett writes that “[as] with becoming an atheist, being an atheist also 
tends to be unduly simplified.”59 For some, atheism is integral to their identity, for others 
it is not. How atheism plays into their identity also varies—e.g., whether they relate to 
religion in a hostile or friendly way. They (and we) have ways of imagining the world 
and conceiving of goodness which cannot be dismissed out of hand or with a simple 
formula. And while “atheist” is a particular type of nonbeliever, the same can be said of 
Nones in general. 
 Variety and choice is highly valued in our world today, and nonbelievers are no 
exception. Given how our view of the world has shifted from something imbued with 
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meaning and order to something we can use as we think best, the stress on choice and 
agency makes sense. Manning speaks of “choice narratives”—stories told by parents 
raising their children which stress how they are helping the children choose for 
themselves what religious beliefs they ought to hold. She observes that “celebration of 
personal choice in religion is, of course, not limited to Nones; indeed, the majority of 
Americans claim to affirm personal choice.”60 While Nones take a variety of paths in the 
particulars of exposing their children to religion (some go back to their church of origin, 
some go to a new place of worship, some stay away, to give but a few examples), “the 
decision is always framed as a way to help the child make his or her own choices.”61 
Manning noted absolutely no exceptions among those she interviewed in this framing. 
While many participants recognized that exposing their children to some religious 
traditions and not others (even in the name of thoroughness, none were exposed to 
fundamentalist Christianity, for instance), they all spoke of their hope that what they did 
would ultimately lead to their children being free to choose a tradition for themselves, 
acknowledging the tension of choice and limited options. One mother called what she 
was doing a certain form of “brainwashing,” even though she is passing on what she 
believes to be true.62 In the book of Samuel, a well-meaning Uzzah was stricken dead by 
God for touching the Ark of the Covenant, because he was not a priest (2 Sam. 6:1-7). 
One gets the sense parents fear that touching their child’s autonomy, even if well-
meaning, might likewise see them struck dead by the powers that be. 
                                                 
60 Christel Manning, Losing Our Religion: How Unaffiliated Parents are Raising Their Children (New 
York: NYU Press, 2015), 138 
61 Ibid., 140 
62 Ibid., 141-142 
  25   
 
 While this personal emphasis on belief is regularly found throughout the West, it 
can be particularly present among Nones. Manning notes that “what makes Nones 
distinctive from churched Americans is their insistence upon worldview choice.”63 The 
trend we noted above where parents did not want to interfere in the free choice of their 
children highlights how personal this choice is seen as. From the Old Testament to Leave 
it to Beaver, the parent who is able to give wise advice on how to live and what choices 
to make in life is a well-established concept within Western society (indeed, this is a 
concept which can likewise be found in most other societies throughout the world). To be 
clear, the argument here is not that unchurched parents are abdicating their 
responsibilities as parents—indeed, Manning documents them showing an extraordinary 
amount of care in how the talk to their children about religion and worldview. Whatever 
their motives, it is not apathy or unconcern. They see the discharge of their duties not in 
the giving of advice or the guiding of choice, but in the withholding of advice or guidance 
to their children. This is, at the very least, a testament to how strongly they see the 
personal dimension of belief. To believe in the Age of Authenticity is to believe in a way 
that is personal—which is to say that the belief must engage the whole person, and that 
belief very often (especially among the unchurched) is something taken on by the 
individual, rather than something handed on by the community. 
 Naturally, these beliefs take on a variety of concrete forms. Among the Nones, 
Manning identifies four basic worldviews: Unchurched believer, seeker, philosophical 
secularist, and indifferent. Unchurched believers have beliefs that line up with an 
organized religion (Christianity, Judaism, etc.), seekers tend to have an impersonal view 
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of God and draw upon a variety of traditions (and their own ideas) to talk about and 
practice their beliefs, philosophical secularists deny any sort of higher power, while the 
indifferent have no self-given religious label and no particular interest or attraction to 
supernatural topics.64 
 Among nonbelievers, some are hostile towards religion, but many are not. Baggett 
tells the story of Margaret Daly,65 who even as a child continually asked people why they 
believed in God and recounts that “I never found an adult who could answer it.”66 When 
she was about to receive Catholic confirmation, she spoke with a priest about why, and 
he tried to convince her by saying that “if you don’t get confirmed, you can’t get married 
in the Church.”67 Belief in God was presented to her as something that one simply does 
out of propriety, and the sacraments as something one gets in order to abide by the rules 
and get nice perks like pretty wedding venues. Margaret did not see anything terribly 
personal about Catholic faith, and she did not notice that there was anything personal 
about the faith of those she knew. It did not appear to engage them in anything but a 
superficial level.  
 For individuals such as Rick Childress, the initial difficulty was that “I never felt 
it.”68 Various doctrines did not make sense to him, and when he tried to ask others why 
they believed, the responses were a range of doubt and anger. Rick did not even get as far 
as Margaret, who at least got answers, even if they were unsatisfying. As he puts it, “they 
just wouldn’t even consider what I was saying.”69 If the people in Rick’s life had active 
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faith, they were not willing to share it with him and help him to understand. Rick wanted 
to ask questions, but the religious people in his life would not even permit it. He was 
frustrated by their lack of critical thinking on religion. Rather than opening them up to 
questions, what Rick saw as their “blind faith” closed them off to inquiry. He recognized 
that it provided them with morals and rootedness, but did not feel he needed religion to 
have these things.  
 When it comes to morals, both Baggett and Manning note that the reason some 
individuals leave their religious traditions (and sometimes religion in general) is a 
discomfort with moral and political positions taken by religious groups. Baggett presents 
Linda Reems, who found Christianity, Judaism, and Islam to have “all the trappings of 
racism, homophobia, and misogyny.”70 Manning looks at the Millennial generation (those 
who reached adulthood around the turn of the Millennium) and notes that “many of these 
young people […] may reject religion because they associate it with a politics of 
intolerance they reject.”71 The close association of religious groups and conservative 
moral and political positions is generally a problem for younger nonbelievers. Whether or 
not certain moral stances should be articulated, at the very least they have not been 
articulated compellingly for these people.72  
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 In some cases, people embrace nonbelief not primarily because of dissatisfaction 
with religion, but because of how well nonbelievers articulate their worldviews. Baggett 
tells the story of Doug Simon, who was often bored in church but amazed by his 
scientific studies. Science itself did not pose a problem for his belief in God. Doug 
recounts how one day he was reading the works of popular science author Carl Sagan and 
“was amazed at how he could write so poetically about science.”73 He found Sagan’s 
explanation of evolution especially moving, experiencing a newfound connection with 
other organisms as a result. A felt, perceived connection was now present which he had 
not experienced before. In the Age of Authenticity, this felt connection is critical.  
 The autonomy and authenticity prevalent today do require certain virtues to be 
stressed. Kant trumpeted courage. Manning notes that contemporary Nones “deeply value 
integrity or ‘being genuine.’”74 Be it Kant’s courage or Manning’s integrity, the addition 
of virtues to this stance is no small thing. Turner observes that a major factor which 
helped the spread of non-belief was when it became possible to put forward a “morality 
[that] lacked supernatural objects, and it had now become possible to explain and secure 
it without invoking God.”75 Atheist and amoral are no longer interchangeable. When 
godlessness does not equate with immorality, rejecting God may be seen as a moral 
choice. There is now something attractive or admirable that is part of the package, and 
not just stark rejection. Courage remains recognized as a cardinal virtue within 
Christianity, and it would be hard to argue from a theistic stance that integrity (or 
something like it) should not be sought.  
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Manning observes that the Nones have taken this courage and integrity to their 
logical conclusion, as she cites integrity as the reason why Nones “are unwilling to 
compromise and simply settle for a community, religious or alternative, that is a less-
than-perfect match.”76 They see the value of being embedded in a community, but they 
are going to join a community on their terms, not the community’s. The stress on 
authenticity fuels the spirituality of quest we have noted above. It arises from and 
reinforces the individualism of the age. Turner rightly sees that “[if] divine purpose does 
not inhere in the cosmos, then human beings must define their own brief lives amid a 
pointless vastness.”77 Belief in God may help with this for some, or it may not. Manning 
cites the case of Susan, who takes elements from multiple religious traditions, noting that 
“Susan does not feel she should have to choose; instead, she selects elements based on 
what meets her subjective needs.”78 While Susan is interested in (as she puts it) a religion 
that “has God as its center” she classifies this as something “I do want in a religious 
tradition” rather than something based on a conviction of monotheism. Manning further 
notes that Susan is not an isolated case. With the failure of moral and religious systems to 
provide a compelling account of flourishing, individuals have re-purposed them to help 
them achieve what they take flourishing to be—a trend dubbed “moral therapeutic 
deism.” One does not assent to religious or moral statements because they are taken to be 
true, but because they enable one’s own autonomy and authenticity. Disenchantment and 
the Immanent Frame turn autonomy and authenticity into moral imperatives. I must 
determine my own purpose, because no one else can do so for me.  
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This likewise leads to one element of the modern malaise that Taylor sees, as 
from this great burden of determining one’s very purpose “arises the distinctively modern 
angst.”79 This angst may also help account for Smith’s observation that therapists have 
replaced priests. They not only help us account for and respond to evil in the world, they 
guide us on our quest to attain life’s ultimate meaning—hence Elkin’s attempt cited 
above to help his fellow psychologists develop a “humanistic spirituality.”80 Therapists 
attend to the problem of evil and suffering in the psyche in a generally immanent 
manner.81 
Elkin showed us what belief that can be multi-faceted looks like on a group level, 
and with Manning, we see what it looks like on an individual level. Manning quotes one 
interviewee, Renee, saying that “[if] I raised them [i.e., her children] in another Christian 
religion it would probably be okay, too, and I’ve always felt that way. My sister raised 
her kids Jewish and that’s fine, too.”82 Religion is seen among Nones as useful way to 
instill a given set of values. As the values are the ultimate goal, the delivery system may 
be somewhat flexible—though even here, “somewhat” must be stressed. As noted above, 
the individuals Manning interviewed never considered affiliating with more 
fundamentalist Christian denominations, presumably because these groups would make 
insufficient allowance for an open-ended, multi-faceted approach to belief. If these 
conditions are not met, the proposition will not be believed in or assented to by these 
groups. At the very least, we can say for now that there is an element of truth in this 
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impulse. Certainly within Catholicism there is a range of opinions which may be held that 
are still within the spectrum of orthodoxy—Thomist, Augustinian, and other schools 
abound. Moreover, there are a range of spiritualities, including Benedictine, Franciscan, 
and Ignatian approaches to prayer. As with the Nones, it is not a question of “anything 
goes,” but of a limited flexibility. 
Looking at a recent play, we can get a final image of what a person in the 
Immanent Frame might look like. In the Broadway musical Avenue Q, much of the play 
revolves around the main character, Princeton, trying to figure out his purpose in life, 
musing in the opening song “what is my life going to be?” He thinks that he can make a 
difference “to the whole human race,” but has no idea how.83 The question itself can only 
be asked in the Age of Authenticity. Not only does it imply a certain freedom of choice 
regarding the roles he will take on and how he will live them, but it is posed in the 
singular—my life. Aristotle would start by asking “what is the good life for all humans?” 
Princeton starts by asking about the direction of his own life. Whatever the answer, it 
needs to be particular to him, and be an organic part of his own life. In a word, it must be 
authentic. By the end, Princeton thinks he has found his purpose in life: to serve as a 
mentor to someone else. His hopes are dashed by the person rebuffing his offer as 
patronizing (the play suggesting that the criticism is accurate). As he laments his failure 
in discovering his purpose, one friend notes that “maybe you’ll never find your purpose,” 
with another friend getting the finale started by singing “Everyone’s a little bit 
unsatisfied/ Everyone goes ‘round a little empty inside.” However, it’s all ok, because 
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everything—both good and bad—is only “for now.” 84  What is important is not that 
one’s quest comes to a conclusion, but that one continue seeking, accept the transient 
nature of things, and accept that fulfillment is unlikely at best. The portrayal of the 
transient and unfulfilling nature of life would not be out of place in a thinker like St. 
Augustine, except that Augustine saw the next life as a possible source of permanence 
and fulfillment, so long as you were with God. 
This is the basic state of the Age of Authenticity—seeking, though not necessarily 
hoping to find; embracing an ethos of individuality, where spiritual practice and personal 
identity are strongly linked; wanting more than what life is offering without denigrating 
the good already present in life; troubled by the evil witnessed in all its forms, especially 
those that seem to come from human impulses that we cannot quite control. There are 
both “Closed World Structures” and “Open World Structures” within the Immanent 
Frame. The former shuts one out to the possibility of transcendence, while the latter may 
still have a sense that there is more to fullness than what is around us. But one of the 
problems in a Closed World Structure is that over time they begin to seem less obvious—
the more time you spend in a closed world, the less closed it seems. This is key to 
Taylor’s account of secularity and secularization, because “Taylor has been contesting 
such self-congratulatory stories all along.”85 The Immanent Frame is not the only 
possible choice. Part of the key here as we look at evangelization is to see how we know 
and come to certitude in our present age, and how our ideas of knowing shifted to bring 
us to the Immanent Frame.  
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Chapter 2: Incarnate Knowing 
 
I. TAYLOR AND EXCARNATION 
 When Taylor speaks of excarnation, he notes that “[modern] enlightened culture 
is very theory-oriented. We tend to live in our heads, trusting in our disengaged 
understandings.”86 Without using the exact terms, Taylor notes that this privileging of 
theory extends to the three transcendentals of true, beautiful, and good.87 To understand 
our experiences and the world around us, we need an impartial distance. Think for 
instance of the scientific paradigm. The gold standard of scientific research is an 
experiment which can be repeated by any individual at any time. Beauty is perhaps the 
worst off, as it cannot tell us anything “except about our own feelings.”88 And “the only 
valid form of ethical self-direction is through rational maxims or understanding.”89 
Unlike an Aristotelian stance, where practice is essential to knowing what is moral, and 
Aristotle himself would not dream of trying to invent maxims to cover every scenario due 
to the numerous variables, the Enlightenment stance requires it. One’s moral action must 
be intelligible in the abstract. We have essentially applied the scientific gold standard to 
moral reasoning—it must be repeatable by any person, at any time. There is no room for 
phronesis.  
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 Smith looks at the religious implications of excarnation and notes that it is a 
“move of disembodiment and abstraction […] a ‘purified’ religion—purified of rituals 
and relics, but also of emotion and bodies.”90 Smith notes first that “Kant’s ‘rational’ 
religion is the apotheosis” of this move.91 Kant advocated “religion within the bounds of 
reason,” and his ethical dictates are universally applicable (famously so, in fact). Kant’s 
metaphysics placed an unbridgeable gulf between the mind and reality. This includes the 
reality of our own bodies—even our own physical existence is only known as 
phenomenon, never as noumenon. And Smith notes that “[with] the body goes the Body; 
that is, with the abandonment of material religion we see the diminishment of church as 
communion.”92 As the Church replicates the Enlightenment’s excarnation, so too it 
replicates its individualism. 
 Kant may have been the height of excarnation, but he was certainly not the origin. 
While excarnation certainly had grandparents, its parent in the West in Taylor’s view was 
Descartes, who argued that “we need to distance ourselves from our understanding of 
things, in order to achieve clear and distinct knowledge.”93 Descartes’s method was to 
isolate himself in a winter cabin, doubting everything until he could no longer doubt. 
Unlike later moderns, his skepticism was a means, rather than an end, but it was a crucial 
part of his method. He could not trust his eyes because of optical illusions, or because 
perspective could blur whether a thing was small or just far away. Likewise his other 
senses. One’s senses can always be deceived. Even beliefs and desires that one has as an 
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adult should be questioned, since many of these thoughts and impulses were developed 
during childhood, a time when we are particularly open to persuasion—and therefore 
deception. Because of this, Descartes advocated that at least once in a person’s life, one 
should examine systematically each individual thought and belief. We should catalog 
every presupposition and put it to the test.94 
 We might think that an empiricist such as Locke would have an incarnate 
approach to knowledge, since an empiricist is immersed in the world of sense, and 
therefore, the world of bodies. Yet Lockean empiricism has a decidedly excarnate streak 
in it. First, Locke “clearly takes mathematical knowledge as the paradigm of knowledge,” 
in agreement with Descartes.95 What Locke calls “the clearest and most certain kind of 
knowledge” are definitions like “white is not black” and mathematical propositions such 
as “three is more than two.”96 The ideal remains mathematical universals, while a 
Medieval such as Aquinas would stress that knowledge is incomplete if there is not 
knowledge of both universals and particulars.  
In Taylor’s narrative, Locke made two key contributions on the road to excarnation. The 
most important is the concept of the tabula rasa, the “blank slate.” Locke conceives of 
“the human mind as a tabula rasa, waiting to have its habits imprinted on it,” resulting in 
“a theory of human nature as malleable.”97 In the same way that a blank slate or an empty 
page is totally receptive to whatever is put on it, so too our minds can receive anything 
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we give to them. And so “it becomes easier to lose the sense that there is a limit in 
principle to the malleability of people, to the advance of the higher over the lower.”98 The 
human mind is infinitely programable, not determined by matter, by environment, by 
anything embodied. Matter is matter, spirit is spirit. To the extent that there is interplay 
between mind and spirit, it is solely uni-directional: the exertion of control of mind over 
body. Body in no way conditions mind—the “lower” has no influence over the “higher.” 
 In addition, Locke (along with others such as Adam Smith) was crucial in helping 
to re-cast the notion of divine providence. While older notions of providence were about 
“a benign ultimate plan for the cosmos, with Lock and Smith we see a new emphasis: 
providence is primarily about ordering this world for mutual benefit, particularly 
economic benefit.”99 And so the inclinations and desires that we have do not necessarily 
relate to any higher purpose or power. If I have a desire for profit or civic participation or 
anything else, it is because nature is well-ordered (perhaps by God, but God is not 
terribly necessary in this conception) to its own fruition. This of course justifies Smith’s 
laissez faire capitalism, but also Locke’s contractual view of morality and government. 
For Locke, “God gave us our powers of reason and discipline so that we could most 
effectively go about the business of preserving ourselves.”100 So long as we act with 
reason, and use discipline to clamp down on our embodied impulses, we will act with 
Enlightened self-interest to maintain our lives and property, and therefore we will fulfill 
God’s will. While there is certainly a place for altruism in Locke’s conception, it is only 
because it is proper to the sustenance of an economically viable society. But there is no 
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sense that in so acting, or in reflecting on these moral impulses, we have anything like an 
experience of God. Just as matter and spirit are quite divorced from one another, so are 
this world and the next.  
 From Locke, of course, comes Hume—the person Taylor sees as the main rival of 
Kant for excarnate knowing. Hume does “have a place for feeling in ethics, the reaction 
of sympathy, but accords this no power to discern its good or bad uses. This a calculating 
reason must determine.”101 Taylor is quite correct that Hume’s mistrust of emotion in 
ethics is a move towards excarnation. However, here is part of where Taylor does not go 
quite far enough in recognizing how excarnate Hume is. Hume mistrusts the emotions, 
but he also mistrusts a great many other things. He mistrusts anything which is not 
plainly evident before his own eyes—though this is likewise up for debate. Even 
generalizations such as “the sun will rise tomorrow” cannot be settled upon with 
certitude. Hume mistrusts emotion, he mistrusts reason, he mistrusts the testimony of 
people who say “a miracle has happened.” Everything about our embodied existence—
senses, brain, emotions, living with other people—has a certain air of unreliability for 
Hume. Taylor is right that Hume represents an excarnate way of knowing—in fact, he is 
more right than he realizes.  
 As Taylor tells his tale, he shows how these figures, as part of the larger drive for 
reform that turns the Western engine, have helped us think in increasingly excarnate 
ways. These thinkers have all tapped into a cultural desire for greater knowledge, for 
social change, for integrating scientific thought into our lives, and in doing so have 
(perhaps inadvertently) encouraged ways of thinking about self, society, and world which 
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tends to disregard the bodily. This has severe ethical implications. When Pope Francis 
laments how we treat the world in his encyclical Laudato Si, he places a fair share of the 
blame at the feet of the “technocratic paradigm,” which he describes as a way of thinking 
that “exalts the concept of a subject who, using logical and rational procedures, 
progressively approaches and gains control over an external object.”102 As James K.A. 
Smith observed, this framework of domination of rationality over matter—even to the 
point of disdain—is very much at the heart of excarnate thinking.103  
II. NEWMAN AND THE ILLATIVE SENSE 
While the full significance of the move of excarnation is only now being realized, as we 
have seen, the pieces have been in place for some time, and the trend itself has been 
around since Descartes. John Henry Newman was certainly exposed to it. Born in 1801, 
Newman was raised as an Anglican. He attended Oxford University, where he was 
studied the early Christian thinkers known as the Church Fathers, and would maintain a 
scholarly interest in the Fathers until his death in 1890. He became an Anglican priest in 
1825, but in 1845, increasingly convinced of the Catholic Church’s historical claims, he 
converted from Anglicanism to Catholicism and became a Catholic priest. As a priest, he 
engaged in pastoral ministry, took on administrative duties, and was constantly writing 
both scholarly pieces and more popular works.104   
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The excarnation exhibited by the Enlightenment both inside and outside of the 
Church was a worrying trend for Newman. Theologian Brian Daley notes that by “the 
end of the nineteenth century […] other voices were increasingly heard, critical of the 
scholastic model for being overly conceptual, even rationalistic in its understanding of 
how humans come to know God.”105 Newman was not formed in the scholastic method 
common in Catholic seminaries common at the time, and so is able to provide an 
alternative for Catholic thought.  
 The great historian of philosophy Etienne Gilson sees the patristic formation of 
Newman, with their pastoral concern and their emphasis on the Incarnation and the lived 
mysteries of salvation, and sees that because of Newman “the great theological style of 
the Fathers has been worthily revived in the nineteenth century.”106 Newman takes the 
style and emphasis of the Fathers and brings it to bear on the Enlightenment trends (both 
in and out of the Church), and so helps us to grapple with excarnation wherever it may be 
found. Above all, Newman’s incarnate way of knowing may be found in his Grammar of 
Assent, where we will now turn our attention. 
When Newman wrote the Grammar of Assent, he saw a variety of camps advocating 
ideal ways of knowing things, but none which actually matched up with how actual 
humans thought. Various thinkers were taking one or another valid way that humans 
know (through sense-data, through careful reasoning, through considering ideas, etc.) and 
holding it as the only or the primary way in which one comes to know. Newman was not 
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a professional academic, but rather a pastor. His main worry was how these trends would 
influence Christian belief. For Newman, “[so] far as religious belief was concerned, he 
was convinced that the serious intellectual threat came from hard-headed logicians.”107 
Therefore, wading into these debates was, for Newman, a pastoral necessity. Newman 
himself wrote in a letter that “[an] evil time is before us. Principles are being adopted as 
starting points which contradict what we know to be axioms. It follows that the only 
controversy which is likely to do good is philosophical.”108 The Grammar of Assent is 
that philosophical work. Yet as Newman biographer Ian Ker notes, it is not a 
metaphysical work, but also not a psychological study. “Rather, it is a philosophical 
analysis of that state of mind which we ordinarily call certitude or certainty and of the 
cognitive acts associated with it.”109 Certitude was, in many ways, the project of 
Newman’s life, with the Grammar as its culmination.  
Newman looks at certitude in practical terms, in the context of human life and the 
mind’s operations. To be able to say “yes, this is the case,” and then reflect upon that 
statement and affirm “I am correct in saying thus” is a natural state of mind, one which is 
necessary in order to live one’s life. Even the most practical decisions such as one’s 
politics are influenced by the ability to say “I am certain.” To be sure, Newman does not 
hold that only certitude is natural to the mind. Early on in the Grammar, Newman holds 
that “these three acts [i.e., doubt, inference, and assent] are all natural to the mind.”110 
Further, Newman clarifies what he means by calling these acts “natural” when he says 
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that “in exercising them, we are not violating the laws of our nature, as if they were in 
themselves an extravagance or weakness, but are acting according to it, according to its 
legitimate constitution.”111 This is part of what makes Newman’s way of knowing so 
incarnate—he is able to accept the mind as it is, and its natural functions as something to 
be accepted, rather than something to be disciplined out of the thinker.  
Moreover, each of the three activities— refusing to hold to something, holding to 
something conditionally, and holding to something unconditionally—are all equally 
acceptable. Newman will not say that we ought to always assent or always doubt. We 
should assent when we have cause to assent, and doubt when we have cause to doubt. As 
we will see, he does favor a basic stance of credulity over one of skepticism, but this does 
not mean that skepticism and doubt have no place in the life of the mind. Newman asserts 
that “[we] do but fulfil our nature in doubting, inferring, and assenting; and our duty is, 
not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself 
right rightly.”112 Each of these three acts is good in theory. What will make the act good 
in fact depends on the context and the way in which the act is carried out. In direct 
contrast to the early Modern thinkers, Newman is not searching for an Archimedean point 
to grasp all truth. He does not have the Kantian categories, the Cartesian cogito, the 
Lockean sense impressions, or the Humean skepticism. Newman has the human mind, 
with all its various functions, and the world we inhabit, with all its various contexts. The 
human knower is fully embodied, and the human knower is fully embedded. Newman 
will not proceed forward any other way.  
                                                 
111 Ibid, 24-25 
112 Ibid, 25 
  43   
 
We do not need to be perfect calculating machines in order to have any sort of 
knowledge. Theologian and Newman scholar Martin Moleski notes that even the 
“structure of the Grammar indicates the major misunderstanding that Newman wanted to 
clear up: that perfect comprehension and complete proof are required for enduring 
certitude.”113 Newman’s concern here is quite pastoral, and thus quite human. For 
Newman, “[certitude] then is essential to the Christian; and if he is to persevere to the 
end, his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence.”114 In certitude, there is 
freedom. If I am certain that the floor beneath me can bear my weight, I will happily run 
and jump all over it. If, however, I think that the floor is rotten, I will be very cautious, 
perhaps not even wanting to put even a little weight on it. This freedom of certitude 
“increases one’s freedom to act upon faith.”115 The freedom to act and the freedom to 
move forward in faith are not things that Newman wants to restrict to the intelligentsia. 
Not every person has Descartes’s luxury of sitting in a cabin all winter. But Newman 
wants every person to be able to come to Christian faith, and act in freedom. So rather 
than force everyone to become a philosopher, “[one] makes the best of what one has been 
given in human nature, even if it is not the ‘best’ from an idealistic or a priori 
standpoint.”116 Newman will spend no time quibbling over better ways to come to an 
ideal certitude—he wants to explore what actual certitude in actual people looks like, to 
open up the floodgates of reasonable certitude to all without requiring doctoral seminars 
in Kant.  
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This move, and Newman’s general stress on the goodness of human nature, help 
shed light on why Newman does not deal with the problem of sense perception and 
common misunderstandings. Verbeke observes that “Newman, like Aristotle, attaches a 
very positive value to what people commonly accept and believe to be true.”117 The 
senses do sometimes lead us astray, but they are reliable far more often than not. We do 
certainly have errors in logic and make poor decisions. But, on a practical, level most 
people have sufficient judgment to get through the day alive. Our emotions can lead us 
astray; but, all things being equal, they can be powerful indicators of when something 
does or does not sit right with our values—someone experiencing horror and revulsion at 
the sight of a racist gathering need not ask whether they are right to be horrified (though 
someone experiencing joy at such a sight should be self-critical).  
Because of this, Newman has an incarnate way of knowing, though some of what he has 
said would seem to be at odds with Taylor. Admirand notes that for Taylor “any 
dominant reliance upon reason to the detriment and repression of the body, emotions, and 
passions will have severe negative consequences.”118 Newman has been speaking of 
reason, and how we are at the whims of our feelings without assent and certitude. Is this 
not the reliance upon reason and repression of emotion that Taylor speaks of? Not 
necessarily.  
The key is that Newman will never say that feelings have no place in moral 
reasoning. If, to use Taylor’s example, I feel revulsion at infanticide, Newman will 
applaud this. He will see such a feeling as an example of the person quickly apprehending 
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the evil taking place and having the appropriate physical response. Newman places the 
same value as Aristotle on such common perceptions. Aristotle, of course, holds that one 
“who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, 
when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised.”119 In the system of Aristotle and 
Newman, anger (and other emotions) are never repressed by reason, but they are ordered 
by them. If I feel anger at seeing film of the Birmingham police turning fire hoses on civil 
rights activists, this is righteous. If I feel anger at watching King’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech,” this is evidence of a malformed conscience. In both cases, the anger depends 
upon what I have assented to—certain ideas of race and justice, in this case. At the heart 
of right feeling is assent, at the heart of assent is the Illative Sense.  
As we have seen, Newman distinguishes three basic stances we can take to a 
statement. We can question or deny it, which is a stance of doubt. We can affirm it 
conditionally, which is a stance of inference. Or we can affirm it unconditionally, which 
is a stance of assent. Doubt is fairly straightforward. With inference, Newman sees three 
basic types: formal, informal, and natural. Formal inference is precise logical reasoning. 
The logical systems devised by Aristotle or Peter Abelard, or the scientific method, 
would be examples of formal inference. Informal inference is the less precise way in 
which we evaluate large amounts of evidence—especially propositions—and make our 
conclusions based on the probability suggested by the evidence. The person who asserts 
“Great Britain is an island,” even though that person has never actually walked the whole 
coastline, but has enough testimonies and reasons for thinking so that the conclusion is 
deemed probable based on the evidence has made an informal inference. Natural 
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inference is so-called because “our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from 
propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete.”120 The 
farmer who looks around and knows quite accurately what tomorrow’s weather will be is 
one who engages in natural inference. He has gone from thing (sensible environment 
right now) to thing (weather tomorrow), even though he might not be able to show his 
work.  
Assent comes in two forms: real and notional. Notional assent is when we grasp 
unconditionally an abstract or general statement (e.g. “all humans are mortal”). Real 
assent is when we grasp unconditionally a particular or concrete statement (e.g. “I am 
mortal.”) as particular or concrete. This last qualification is important, as it helps us see 
what Newman is getting at with real assent. Newman holds, for instance, that the exact 
same statement can be notional at one point in my life and real in another. If as a boy I 
recognize on a theoretical level that I am going to die eventually, I do have notional 
assent to the proposition, but until I actually grasp how I really am mortal, it is not real 
assent, even though the statement itself is particular. When I reflect upon something I 
assent to, and accept unconditionally this assent, then I am in a state of certitude. As 
Newman puts it, certitude is “the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a 
truth.”121 To be certain is a natural state of mind, which is to say that it is something 
which minds tend to, something which is agreeable to human nature, and something 
which may be considered good. But it is not automatic. Newman notes that “great 
numbers of men must be considered to pass through life with neither doubt nor, on the 
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other hand, certitude […] but with only a simple assent.”122 Any mind can come to truth 
and assent to it, but certitude (or doubt) will require a level of reflection that not all 
people engage in. Newman is attentive to the reality of the knowing subject, and so freely 
acknowledges that the same statement is notional assent for one person and real assent for 
another, or even inference for one person and assent for another. Moreover, this 
difference between subjects does not seem to distress Newman. The state of the 
knower—including the maturity level—partly impacts how we classify that which is 
known. Within the knower, the main variable that impacts how we know what we know, 
and that guides us from start to finish in the knowing process, is the Illative Sense.  
The Illative Sense comes towards the end of Newman’s Grammar, but it is very 
much the key to the rest of the work. The Illative Sense is what makes this type of human 
reasoning possible. Newman observes that “in no class of concrete reasonings, whether in 
experimental science, historical research, or theology, is there any ultimate test of truth or 
error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its 
sanction.”123 When Newman is speaking of concrete reasonings, he is speaking in 
contrast to abstract reasoning. An abstract statement may be “all humans will die.” A 
statement becomes concrete once a person apprehends the truth of the statement not only 
in the abstract, but in particular instances. So in the sciences a medical doctor may be 
aware of various symptoms and diseases, but if her scientific knowledge is to be of any 
practical value, she is going to need to know how to tell a malignant or benign tumor not 
just in the abstract, but in the patient in front of her. Tom Wolfe recounts a historical 
incident in The Right Stuff where Chuck Yeager and Neil Armstrong are debating suitable 
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weather conditions for landing a test-aircraft. “Armstrong said the meteorological data, 
considering the wind and temperature factors, indicated the surface would be 
satisfactory.” However Yeager, who had far more experience than Armstrong at this 
point, replied to their superiors at NASA that “‘I’ve been flying over these lakes for 
fifteen years, and I know it’s muddy.’”124 Just as Yeager predicted, the ground at the 
landing strip was muddy, damaging the landing gear of the aircraft. Armstrong was able 
to engage in abstract reasoning—given the weather and meteorological calculations, the 
ground ought to be dry enough. Yeager was able to engage in concrete reasoning, and 
bring both his considerable knowledge of aircraft and his long experience in the area to 
bear upon the question of suitable weather conditions. Just as Newman said, Yeager was 
ultimately unable to appeal to anything beyond his own judgment. Had Newman been in 
the room with Armstrong and Yeager in April 1962, he would have been unsurprised 
both at the disagreement and Yeager’s ultimate vindication, and he and Yeager likely 
would have been in agreement from the start. That particular judgment born of both 
experience and excellence in a field, which pilots such as Yeager called “the right stuff,” 
is precisely what Newman has in mind when he speaks of the Illative Sense. Even 
something as seemingly objective as scientific knowledge requires judgment in how it is 
applied, and for this one needs the Illative Sense.  When Yeager tried to explain why he 
was right, he did not give a chain of logic to back himself up, he simply pointed to his 
experience of the area and his judgment. His argument was, essentially, “this is true, and 
you are going to have to trust me.”  
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Newman affirms that “[such] ratiocination […] is found in the uneducated—nay, in all 
men.”125 Inference and logic is universal. As noted above, inference—along with doubt 
and assent—are one of the three basic states of mind. It has its proper place in the life of 
the mind, and is good when in that proper place. Formal inference and logic can help 
clear up misconceptions and straighten out our thinking, and can bring us together. If I 
present the steps of my formal reasoning one at a time, another person can follow it and 
perhaps come to the same conclusion, or help me if I am mistaken. Yeager was correct, 
but one disadvantage was that he was unable to share his thoughts with Armstrong or 
their superiors at NASA. Logic “enables the intellects of many, acting and re-acting on 
each other, to bring their collective force to bear upon one and the same subject-
matter.”126 There is a universality to logic. With the scientific method, many scientists 
can collaborate on one project. The fruits of this speak for themselves—as they did even 
in Newman’s day, when the Industrial Revolution had already made its mark. Newman 
sees that in logic and science, their “very perfection lies in [their] incompetency to settle 
particulars and details.”127 We need the universal view. Without the ability to go beyond 
the particular and tie the whole together, we would simply have a collection of facts and 
trivia.  
Herein lies Newman’s genius, and what differentiates him from the excarnate 
knowers—he is able to see that the way for knowing some kinds of truth is not the way 
for knowing others. Logic is wonderful at being impersonal and universal. But in logic, 
“its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both ends; both the point at which the proof 
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should start, and the points at which it should arrive, are beyond its reach.”128 We begin 
with principles, beliefs, and experiences that shape the way we are going to think. 
Moreover, some of our experiences are going to shape us and make us more capable of 
thinking in some ways than in others. Someone who has been through military training, 
for instance, is likely going to be able to think well in a crisis situation, and to do so 
rapidly. Some people—through experience, natural talent, or some combination—have an 
ability to simply tinker with engines or machines and make them work. Someone whose 
job is quiet may be more accustomed to thinking slowly and deliberately through abstract 
problems. How we begin our thinking, and how we apply the results of our thinking, 
require the judgment and experience of a person.  
When speaking of the Illative Sense, Newman is clear that “it is the mind that 
reasons, and that controls its own reasonings, not any technical apparatus of words and 
propositions.”129 For all the assistance in logic and formal inference that others may 
provide, ultimately, I am responsible for my own reasoning. As I think about principles 
and applications and everything in between, it is my intellect which processes everything, 
not a truth table or any formula of symbolic logic. Newman is going to resist wherever 
possible the ceding of human thought to an impersonal system, or the Archimedean 
points which so many Enlightenment figures sought after. The Illative Sense “supplies no 
common measure between mind and mind.”130 This is the unique gift of logic, of formal 
inference. But in other areas of the mind—in informal and natural inference, in assent, 
and in doubt, the Illative Sense will be at work. The skill and experience one builds up 
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over time helps one to see how to proceed in a given line of reasoning, and gives a sense 
of when a thing is true or an argument sound.  
Since different people have different skills and experiences, the Illative Sense will 
be built up differently for different people, based either on “personal gift or 
acquisition.”131 Most people will reason badly in some fields, but well in others. Newman 
was amazed at “Newton’s perception of truths mathematical and physical, though proof 
was absent,” calling the Illative Sense he had in this area “nothing short of genius.”132 
But, of course, Newman also was aware that “we should betake ourselves to Newton for 
physical, not for theological conclusions.”133 Newton may have launched a new era of 
physics, but his Biblical commentaries were downright bizarre. Few people may be 
competent in nearly every field of reasoning, but no one will be totally incompetent at 
thinking. Newman has committed himself to an incarnate way of knowing, and one of the 
consequences of this is that, in allowing space for the particular, he allows that 
knowledge itself will be particular—that certain things will be known only by certain 
people.  
Given that the Illative Sense is something which is fostered and developed, and that not 
every person has it equally well in every subject, is there any way in which we can 
develop a sense? Yes. Newman’s studies of the Church Fathers was not about to lead him 
into Gnosticism. He is quite clear that while in some cases the Illative Sense is an inborn 
talent, sometimes it is developed more through cultivation. Some people have a natural 
ear for music, while others acquire a talent for music after many years of study. The best 
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way to cultivate an ear for music is to listen. To dive into music wholeheartedly, to 
absorb pitch and rhythm and tone until it becomes like a second—or even first—
language. The best way to cultivate a mind for truth is to assent. Newman says that if we 
are to begin anywhere, he “would rather maintain that we ought to begin with believing 
everything that is offered to our acceptance, than it is our duty to doubt everything.”134 
As we dive into reality, we begin to separate truth from falsehood, we recognize what is 
flatly contradictory, and we gain a taste for truth and coherence. The more truth we learn, 
the more truth we are equipped to process.  
By throwing ourselves into the world and accepting whatever we can, we are able 
to learn and know the truth. Descartes, Locke, and Hume wanted to keep the world, or at 
least parts of it, at arm’s length, at least until certain elements of it could be further 
studied. Newman wishes to embrace the whole world, not reducing it to what will fit in a 
rational schema. Part of accepting the embodied knower is accepting the world around 
the knower, and accepting that knower and known can co-exist, perhaps even fit together. 
The most that Kant would admit is that the world can be known by forcing it into our 
mental categories. It is not made to be known, but we do force it to be known. Aristotle 
or Aquinas, by contrast, would hold that knowledge is unlocking potency and turning it 
into act. Newman is going to take this path, and encourage a stance of trust towards the 
world as it presents itself, rather than suspicion or dominance.  
Newman is so confident in this stance that he trusts completely what happens afterwards 
if a person adopts it. He points to numerous individuals who have become Catholic 
because they have continually trusted the world around them, and continually desired to 
                                                 
134 Ibid, 377 
  53   
 
affirm and accept more truth. Catholicism in particular, and truth in general, “is reached 
[…] by inquires from all points of the compass, as if it mattered not where a man began, 
so that he had an eye and a heart for the truth.”135 Newman trusts the world and affirms 
the world, and so too with our embodied existence, so that he is confident enough to 
allow a person to start from anywhere and come to the truth, so long as she really is 
seeking truth.  
In his characterization, Newman is drawing heavily (and explicitly) from Aristotle 
and his sense of phronesis. Newman appreciates Aristotle’s observation that “[in] old 
times the mason’s rule which was in use at Lesbos was […] not of wood or iron, but of 
lead, so as to allow of its adjustment to the uneven surface of the stones brought together 
for the work.”136 This is how Aristotle wished to develop his own system of ethics, and in 
turn how Newman wishes to develop his entire way of knowing. Phronesis in morals is 
developed over time. A person becomes just in part by having just friends who model and 
encourage justice in a given situation, and regularly engaging in acts of justice. 
Eventually, regularly engaging in justice transforms into habitually engaging in justice. 
As the musician has developed an ear for music after long hours of practice and exposure, 
so too the virtuous person. Through the development of this habit, phronesis is able to 
guide the person in the best way to carry out a virtue in concrete situations—the rule is 
able to adjust based on the particulars, just as the mason’s rule in Lesbos could.  
Phronesis, like the Illative sense, is judgment born of experience and excellence. 
Both the virtue itself and sufficient experience practicing the virtue are needed for 
phronesis to fully flourish. Yeager was able to judge the suitability of the ground for 
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landing an aircraft because he was a well-trained pilot who had long experience in such 
matters. Armstrong was certainly well-trained, but had not yet developed the needed 
experience. Experience, of course, comes in all sorts of ways. MacIntyre notes that 
“reflective agents […] become self-aware by learning from their mistakes.”137 
Armstrong’s experience in mis-judging the weather and the suitability of the airstrip for 
making a landing was able to aid his ability as a pilot. A clear experience of falsehood 
can help us gain a sense of truth, just as a clear experience of poor pitch can aid the 
musician in hitting the right pitch. Reflecting on for why something went wrong, we are 
able to see concretely the difference between good and bad practices. In these moments, 
rational agents are able to “change, developing and strengthening some traits while losing 
others, so that there is a story to be told about how their desires and their reasons for 
desiring what they desire became whatever it is that they now finally are.”138 The poor 
landing of a test aircraft can enable the pilot to drop bad habits—Armstrong had the 
opportunity to reflect on how his calculations were technically correct, but practically 
wrong, and adjust accordingly. MacIntyre draws out the fact that the development of 
phronesis is the project of a lifetime, and one of the key elements of a life story. As with 
the Illative Sense, phronesis gathers momentum over time, becoming more and more 
honed in the practitioner. While Newman would allow that in other areas of practical 
judgment, some people succeed and others fail, moral judgment was the one area where 
he held that all were capable of right perception. In considering how Newman thinks we 
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know truth, we should consider how he sees us knowing moral truth, and therefore his 
views on conscience, before we develop our conclusions for this chapter. 
III. ILLATIVE SENSE AND CONSCIENCE 
Conscience is the pre-eminent way of knowledge for Newman. He observed that 
“I am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another’s 
lungs.”139 Here we can see why Newman was so endeared to Aristotle’s ethics, and why 
he was at the same time so wary of the totally objective systems proposed by 
Enlightenment thinkers. Hughes looks at Newman’s other great work on conscience, his 
Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, where Newman reminds the duke that “conscience is not 
utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of the greatest number, nor State convenience 
[…] nor a desire to be consistent with oneself.”140 Hughes notes that Newman in this 
“scathing passage obviously expresses a total disdain for a great deal of what he took to 
be the academic fashions of the time […] Hobbesian egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian 
ethics, Darwinian selection, and the rest.”141 As Newman lays out his contempt for these 
various systems of ethics, his final complaint, that conscience is not the same as being 
“consistent with oneself” is worth highlighting.   
Newman does not think that conscience, or abiding by one’s conscience, is the 
same thing as a sort of subjective authenticity. This view is something we may find, for 
instance, in President Obama. When he was running for the U.S. Senate, he gave an 
interview with Cathleen Falsani of the Chicago Sun-Times, where he answered the 
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question “What is sin?” with the answer “Being out of alignment with my values.”142 In 
this, Obama likely represents how many Westerners think about morality. While 
Newman would certainly agree with Obama that one ought not do what one thinks is 
wrong or values as being immoral, conscience is more than a personal estimation of right 
and wrong. Dulles notes that for Newman, “conscience refers us to a sanction higher than 
the self and implies the existence of One to whom we are responsible, and before whom 
we stand guilty and ashamed when we have acted against its bidding.”143 When 
understood rightly, conscience—and the concept of primacy of conscience—is not a self-
referential system of morality, but a process that places the knowing subject in touch with 
creation and the Creator in order to ascertain how best to act to bring about the 
flourishing of the actor. Because of this, and because flourishing has an objective 
dimension to it, others are able to help me and comment upon my moral judgments. 
Throughout MacIntyre’s work, he has stressed a recovery of the importance of friendship 
in Aristotle’s ethics. With Newman’s understanding of conscience, we can see how 
friendship is critical to moral growth. One of the reasons why MacIntyre stresses 
friendship (and urges us to recover Aristotle’s understanding of friendship) is because “it 
is only through such shared deliberation that we are able to overcome the partiality and 
one-sidedness of our own initial judgments and to correct our prejudices.”144 Friendship 
is not only helpful to the moral life, but essential. What holds true for conscience likewise 
holds true for knowledge in general. Because different people have an Illative Sense built 
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up for different fields, a community made up of diverse knowers is vital in the search for 
truth. In the Cartesian or Kantian systems, a brain in a vat could know truth sufficiently, 
given enough time. For Aristotle, Newman, and MacIntyre, only a communion of persons 
working in concert can ever hope to advance in knowledge—moral or otherwise.   
Within conscience, Newman distinguishes two aspects: “a judgment of the reason 
and a magisterial dictate.”145 The former is what we may call the judging function of 
conscience, while the latter is the commanding function. The commanding function is the 
part which makes us feel within ourselves not just that “x is right” but that “I ought to do 
x.” It provides the imperative force of our moral judgments. Moreover, it is this 
experience of conscience which “impresses upon the imagination the idea of a sovereign 
lawgiver [….] It discloses God as a personal being.”146 Even if our judging functions are 
off-base, the commanding function will still urge us to obey, and to do good rather than 
evil. While Newman does not say as much, this part of conscience, which is the part we 
may describe as the voice of God in each heart, is clearly based upon the concept of 
synderesis, that part of conscience which can never be corrupted.147  
But what of the rest of the conscience? Admittedly, this part is less the focus of 
Newman’s writing. In Grammar of Assent, he mainly wants to show that conscience can 
provide us with a personal knowledge of God. However, based on what we have said 
about the Illative Sense and phronesis, we can supplement what Newman himself has 
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said. First, Newman is convinced that “Conscience […] considered as our guide, is fully 
furnished for its office.”148 The structure of conscience is such that “if obeyed, it becomes 
clearer and clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and completes 
the accidental feebleness of its initial teachings.”149 Newman holds, as MacIntyre will 
136 years later, that the development of conscience is a journey. It is not a moment 
captured in a single photograph, but a long and sometimes arduous epic. What Newman 
is saying here is not that if we always follow our consciences we will always be doing 
what is objectively moral, but that if we do so, our consciences will eventually become 
reliable. As with the Illative Sense or the musician’s ear, conscience is developed through 
use, practice, and correction.  
So why is the judging function of conscience able to be developed by all 
individuals, while the Illative Sense in various other fields is not? This is because 
conscience “is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge.”150 Conscience touches 
more directly and more fully on one’s life and existence than any other form of 
knowledge. Newman here shares Aristotle’s presumption that “the good has rightly been 
declared as that which all things aim.”151 It is natural—and thus good—for humans to 
deliberate about their flourishing, and to generally attempt to make choices which enable 
that flourishing. Newman is not only affirming purpose to bodily existence, but reliability 
in attaining that purpose. Our thoughts, our feelings, our inclinations—all of these things 
Newman will take as potentially pointing us in the right direction. Not every human must 
deliberate about questions of physics or music—but every human must deliberate about 
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morality. Every husband who has asked “will I be faithful to my wife?” and every vendor 
who has asked “will I be fair in my transactions?” has wrestled with substantial moral 
questions.  
Just because we all engage in moral thinking, of course, does not mean that we do 
so with the proper beliefs. Hughes notes that in writing to the Duke of Norfolk, 
“conscience […] is not, in Newman’s view, widely fostered by academics. But he does 
not believe the correct view is widely spread among the people, either.”152 Given 
Taylor’s observations about how academic and popular discourse are influenced by each 
other throughout history, this should not be surprising. Indeed, we have seen that this is 
why Newman decided to write a work of philosophy. Helping foster the correct view of 
conscience among the people is no small task, and we can perhaps sketch out a few 
trajectories as we draw our conclusions. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Newman’s thought was a remarkably fresh breath of air in his time. His 
attentiveness to history, to the Church Fathers, and to Classical thought allowed him to 
take a critical eye towards the intellectual trends prevalent both in and out of the Church. 
It is perhaps on account of this freshness that while most of the scholastic arguments 
against major Enlightenment figures have faded more or less into obscurity, Newman’s 
legacy remains strong. What Newman gives us is a reversal of the trend codified by 
Descartes of removing oneself from the world to discover truth. He does not necessarily 
spend great amounts of time arguing directly against early Modern thinkers, but instead 
presents an alternative vision. He acknowledges the legitimacy of their questions—how 
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do we know and come to certitude, how can we decide what we ought to do—but 
provides an alternate solution. Newman’s solution is plausible, as he cites specific figures 
and examples. His knowledge of history is helpful without ever being overwhelming. 
Newman does not simply argue “Locke is wrong, the Church is right, and here’s why.” 
His argument is much subtler. Newman’s argument in Grammar of Assent is, effectively, 
“Locke has a point, but I can address his concern better than he did.” Yet while Newman 
places great value on empirical data, he is able to go much farther than the Empiricists in 
what truths we are able to draw from our senses.  
Because Newman places such a high value on the experiences and judgment at 
the particular level, he offers a way of knowing that any person can live up to and live 
out. His way of knowing is one where we acknowledge and affirm nature as it presents 
itself to us. We affirm the use of our senses, of our general habits of reason, of our 
inclinations (particularly our inclinations towards flourishing). We affirm our experiences 
of the world as basically revelatory of the world, though we must engage in some 
reflection before we realize what exactly has been revealed. Because of the nature of 
truth, this stance of affirmation and assent will more quickly lead us to the knowledge 
and certitude that the Enlightenment thinkers were trying to attain with their methods of 
doubt, skepticism, and objective distance. And because Newman’s method involves 
being present in the world, it is a method which any person can carry out. Not all people 
can remain in a winter cabin to meticulously go through all their beliefs, or cultivate 
skepticism to all things. But anyone can experience the world and think about those 
experiences. Newman wishes to trust nature and the world we live in. As that trust is 
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engendered in people more and more, perhaps our need to use technology to dominate the 
world in fear, a need which Francis decries forcefully in Laudato si, will lessen.  
Moreover, this trust in nature and the processes of nature can help us form 
consciences. The moral implications of excarnation were certainly concerning to Taylor. 
Newman clearly wants to make sure that all individuals are able to come to moral 
knowledge. Just as Taylor wishes to affirm “that part of being good is opening ourselves 
to certain feelings; either the horror at infanticide, or agape as gut feeling.”153 Newman 
will indeed attach moral weight to feelings, and holds that conscience “has an intimate 
bearing on our affections and emotions.”154 Moreover, conscience “is always 
emotional.”155 It is through the urging of emotions that conscience exercises its function 
of commanding. Newman, like Taylor, wishes to see us mind our moral sentiments as 
much as our moral reasonings, and Newman explicitly roots these feelings in the impulse 
from God that we are to do good and avoid evil. Attentiveness to our moral feelings will 
give us a personal experience of God. 
While this function of conscience would seem to be at odds with the judging 
function, as the judging function can be in error (as Newman himself points out), they 
really are two elements of one mental faculty. If we trust the commanding function of 
conscience as the voice of God, then we must ask—what does God ultimately want of us? 
Does God wish us to grow, or to remain the same? Surely we must say, as Newman 
would, that in this life God wishes us to grow. The only time when God might want us to 
remain where we are is when we have achieved our final ends—the ultimate good of 
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human life. MacIntyre notes that for the Aristotelian reflecting on her life, the story will 
ideally “exhibit an increasing directedness, an increasing success in integrating her 
pursuits of the various individual and common goods that she values into a unified 
pursuit of her final good.”156 Increasing success and growth is a hallmark of Aristotelian 
ethics. As Aristotle’s ethics are rooted in a notion of repeated and constantly improving 
practice, moving from good to good in pursuit of one’s end, they help to remind us to 
constantly be improving. Kantian ethics, by contrast, are timeless rules. You do them or 
you don’t. There is not the sense of gradual improvement or directedness in these purely 
objective accounts of morality. But Aristotle and Newman hold out for improvement in 
following one’s moral sense. Newman will urge obedience to one’s conscience, but 
through that obedience conscience should grow. If one’s moral sentiments remain utterly 
unchanged through life, and there is no more integration or directedness at 30 than there 
is at 25, we may legitimately wonder whether the person is giving wholehearted 
obedience to conscience, or simply obeying moral sentiments selectively so as to remain 
“true to one’s self” in a way that cuts off growth. MacIntyre even sees a transcendent 
pattern to moral growth. For MacIntyre “completion of a life consists in an agent’s 
having persisted towards and moving beyond the best goods of which she or he 
knows.”157 This movement towards completion indicates “an object of desire beyond all 
particular and finite goods.”158 MacIntyre sees this moment of recognizing the boundless 
desire of one’s final good as the moment of transition from ethics to natural theology. 
The story must always be kept going, because our wills cannot be satisfied. 
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Here we have a way of encouraging the right way of thinking about conscience 
among people. As we encourage individuals to think about the world in affirming ways, 
and taking a stance of reflective credulity—having a stance of assent that nonetheless 
reflects upon the assent—we should likewise encourage growth. MacIntyre himself lays 
out several life stories as historical examples of such growth. As we encourage people to 
adopt an incarnate way of knowing, we must also encourage them to affirm the urges for 
growth and goodness that is found in the world. An incarnate way of knowing trusts what 
is before us, but not unreflexively. To help people rightly understand conscience, we 
must help them say “my story is not yet finished” and “I can still do better, I can still 
attain better.” We affirm what is already the case, while encouraging more. A medical 
doctor must always be going to conferences and improving his skills. A lawyer gets 
better and better as she argues more cases. In every practice, we find the expectation of 
improvement over time with experience. Neil Armstrong was a better pilot in July 1969 
when he landed on the moon than he was in April 1962 when he landed in the mud. As 
we show the stories of those who have improved and become more directed over the 
course of life, and draw upon examples of improvement various practices, we can show 
individuals how they may come to hold open the possibility for growth in their lives, and 
hopefully obey more completely the impulses of their consciences. As they place more 
trust in their embodied existence and the impulses of their consciences, and as they 
experience more fully how open-ended their desire for goodness in life is, they will 
hopefully have a greater sense that it God who both personally directs their process of 
moral growth, and a personal relationship with God which is the end goal and product of 
this lifelong project.   
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Chapter Three: Newman, Personalism, and Contemporary Belief 
I. NEWMAN’S PERSONALIST TURN 
What is clear by now is that Newman has an appreciation for the concrete and 
whole person. Grammar of Assent does not give us a way of knowing suited to an angel, 
or even a university professor, but for any human. Aristotle began his Metaphysics with 
the observation that “all men by nature desire to know.”159 As we saw in the last chapter, 
both Aristotle and Newman see this drive for knowledge present in all individuals, affirm 
that all individuals can come to some level of knowledge, and affirm what knowledge 
they do have. Aristotle’s concerns are mainly philosophical, while Newman’ are mainly 
pastoral. Newman wishes to affirm that the common person can come to sufficient 
knowledge to believe in Jesus Christ and live a Christian life. If the Christian life were 
only accessible to those with sufficient knowledge and training, but barred from the vast 
majority of people, this would essentially be a latter-day form of Gnosticism. Moreover, 
it would go against the command of Matthew 28 to “make disciples of all nations,” 
among many others (especially those showing a preference for the poor and lowly) to 
assert that only a select group will truly understand Christianity. Taylor notes that this is 
one of the major engines of change is the “deep and growing dissatisfaction” with the 
various “speeds” of practicing Christianity.160 If theology truly is “faith seeking 
understanding,” then the task of the theologian is in some sense to set out in a learned 
fashion what was taught by a grandmother in a simple fashion. Newman has a keen grasp 
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of this. As we will see in this chapter, the way in which Newman is attentive to the 
person who knows—no matter who that person is—has allowed him to develop a way of 
knowing and presenting Christianity that can resonate with contemporary individuals.  
 In responding to many of his contemporaries, Newman anticipated the Personalist 
movement of the 20th Century. As Taylor looks at the dissatisfaction that exists within the 
Immanent Frame, much of it was a reaction against precisely the reductive tendencies of 
the Enlightenment. Talk of authenticity and the rejection of the imposed norms was 
driven in part by a recognition that the norms being imposed did not account for a 
substantial part of the person. Thinkers such as Locke were taking humans as he wished 
them to be, rather than as they are. Crosby puts it well when he says that “Personalism 
[…] emerges in response to a reductionistic, rationalistic image of man.”161 Part of this is 
a reaction against the idea that the natural sciences can explain everything about the 
human person in strictly mechanistic terms—as a system of chemicals, muscles, and 
bones. There is likewise a reaction against Hegelian Pantheism, that sees all things as part 
of God, so that the individual gets lost amidst the larger system.162 The way in which 
humans emerge from and return to God—or Spirit—that tends to portray humans as 
merely a part of something else, and not “a being of its own” is, on the Personalist view, 
an offense against the unique dignity which each person has.163 When we speak of 
Newman’s “Personalist turn,” we are speaking of how he turns to the interior dimension 
of the person—always in touch with the surrounding world—to emphasize what is 
unique, unrepeatable, and good about the individual person. 
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Moreover, there is a concern within Personalism that with such a reductionist 
view of the human person, grave moral violations are possible. Not surprisingly, 
Personalism especially takes off in the wake of World War II, and finds its greatest 
advocates among German (Scheler and von Hildebrand), French (Levinas and Mounier), 
and Polish (Karol Wojtyła, the future St. John Paul II) thinkers—individuals who had 
been most impacted and horrified by the war and by various programs of Nazi eugenics.  
 Part of how Personalism pushes back against the reductive tendencies is to 
emphasize the interiority of each individual, “that each of us exists as subject, not just as 
object.”164 There are inner depths to each individual that objective reason cannot quite 
capture. This would certainly apply to scientific assertions about the person, but it would 
also apply to some philosophical ones, as well. Consider how we saw Newman pushing 
back against the logicians in the previous chapter. The assertion that “logic is open at 
both ends” is Newman’s reaction against logicians reducing all valid human thought to 
precise syllogisms. Newman would have more issues with Descartes’s “clear and distinct 
ideas” than anything about Darwinian evolution.165 The Illative Sense, is a faculty which 
each person possesses yet is unique to each individual, as it is shaped by the individual’s 
own experiences and excellences.  
Newman, like the Personalists of the 20th Century, sees both a depth and a breadth 
to the individual not captured through pure logic. Merrigan even notes that Newman 
gives “pride of place to [his] inner life in the determination of [his] attitudes toward the 
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world and [his] place in it.”166 This does not mean that he ignores the world, but that his 
Patristic sensibilities have given him an appreciation for how passing the visible world is. 
Newman is not an Idealist in this regard—it is not that what is in his mind is more real 
that what he senses. Sense perception and bodily reality matter greatly for Newman, and 
for how Newman thinks we come to know. What we experience, and how we feel about 
what we experience, have weight. Newman is a Realist, but a Christian Realist. Thus the 
spiritual reality that he is able to perceive through conscience anchors his assessment of 
visible reality.  
What Newman provides is a Personalist turn in Western thought. It is not exactly 
a turn to the subject, although we will see in a moment how this fits in to his thought. 
Descartes provides a turn to the subject, but Newman does not only want this. Newman 
wants a turn to the whole person. The inner recesses of my intellect are important, but so 
are the inner recesses of my heart. For that matter, the outer spaces are important, as well. 
My whole self is important—thinking, feeling, experiencing, acting and interacting. All 
of it taken together has value. This is significant when we remember the two great 
critiques of Christianity that Taylor notes: first that Christianity asks us “to ‘transcend 
reality,’ and this cannot but end up but mutilating us,” while the second is that we 
“bowdlerize reality” and make things far too simple.167 In remaining incarnate and 
engaging in a Personalist turn, Newman is able to avoid these difficulties. First, Newman 
does not preach transcendence in a mutilating way. In his own Apologia, Newman does 
not see conversion as definitive separation from the world. Newman notes that 
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“Calvinists make a sharp separation between the elect and the world,” and while he 
acknowledges that there are certain parallels with Catholic teaching on justification, he 
still notes that “Catholics, on the other hand shade and soften the awful antagonism 
between good and evil” and resist a clear delineation between the elect and the 
damned.168 His own journey from religious indifference to Anglicanism to Catholicism is 
shown as organic growth (aided by God’s grace), rather than a total denial of his past or 
his nature. Reflecting on Catholic ideas of conversion at the end of his work, he states 
clearly that the Church “does not teach that human nature is irreclaimable […] not, that it 
is to be shattered and reversed, but shattered, purified, and restored.”169 Part of 
Christianity does involve growing beyond where we are now, but not in a way that 
necessarily vilifies our current state.170 Second, Newman does not bowdlerize and wish 
reality to be something other than it is. As we have seen, Newman distinguishes himself 
in accepting knowing subjects as they are—which partly involves accepting limits to who 
will know what.  
Newman has above all a desire to engage with reality. His interest in the knowing 
subject pushes him on in this regard. In his Lectures on Justification, Newman holds that 
we should first and foremost “preach Christ. But the fashion of the day has been […] to 
preach conversion; to attempt to convert by insisting on conversion.”171 Newman does 
not wish to start with the ideal and then move to the reality—he wishes to start with the 
                                                 
168 John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. David J. Delaura (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
1968), 17-18 
169 Ibid., 190 
170 While Western Christianity does acknowledge Original Sin, this doctrine itself holds that our evil 
tendencies are the result of something foreign to human nature. Human nature is sinful, but not inherently 
so. In overcoming our sinful state we are therefore healing wounds, and becoming more human, rather than 
less. As Augustine—the codifier of Original Sin—notes, “If sin is natural, there is no such thing as sin.” 
City of God XI.15 
171 John Henry Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification (London: Longmans, Green, 1908), 326 
  69   
 
reality. In matters of religion, this means beginning with the person of Jesus Christ. 
Newman decried the preachers of his day who would work up in his audience all sorts of 
feelings—be they of joy or shame—but never spoke of the substance underlying those 
feelings; or who spoke of conversion, but never of what one is converting to. You may 
preach Christ the accuser, Christ the consoler, or Christ in any other manner of acting, but 
you must first and foremost preach Christ. Conversion involves not only a turning, but a 
“turning-outward,” as Crosby puts it.172 Newman does not want to mutilate reality or 
paper it over, but face it head on. The subject must engage with the reality. Indeed, 
Crosby notes that for Newman “we venerate truth more when we abandon the 
detachment of a spectator and encounter it with the engagement of a participant.”173 
Newman recognizes the depths and significance of the knowing subject, but his stress on 
subjective reality only increases the importance of objective reality. Unlike Descartes’s 
subjective turn, it is an emphasis on the subject which does not force “clear and distinct 
ideas” upon every experience of the subject, but embraces the multifaceted and 
sometimes confusing nature of reality. Unlike a subjectivist approach, the knowing 
subject does not determine reality or truth, but learns to appropriate it. The subject does 
not determine reality. Rather, as Merrigan notes, for Newman “[the] self is always being 
constituted by the ‘other’—the other for whom one is responsible, and the Other before 
whom one is responsible.”174 What God bids me to do in conscience helps determine 
what I do, and what I do helps determine who I am. Because conscience is so near to 
me—within me, in fact—the call of and response to conscience shapes me like few other 
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things. Obedience to conscience grounds and shapes the whole self in a particularly 
powerful way. Other roles and tasks that come to me can also shape me—sometimes 
because I accept them, sometimes because I reject them. Knowledge arises not from 
active domination, nor from a passive imprinting on a Lockean Tabula Rasa, but a 
cooperative activity. 
The knowing subject is a participant in the game of knowledge, and so there is 
also an element of agency involved in knowing as well. We saw in the last chapter how 
assent to truth is like cultivating a musical ear—it requires practice, attentiveness, and the 
work of assent. Knowledge for Newman is not a determining act, as with Kantian 
knowing, but one where known and knower “cooperate” to come to knowledge.175 One of 
the conditions of belief in the contemporary age is that belief must be something 
personal—it must arise from the agency of the individual and engage the whole 
individual. The way that Newman stresses the knowing subject gives a place for this 
agency and this personal element to belief. Echoing Kant to a certain degree, Newman 
writes in a letter from 1846 that “you must consent to think.”176 Truth takes time and 
effort to grasp. If Kant stresses courage in his paean to the Enlightenment, Newman 
stresses agency.  
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Knowing for Newman is not simply an act of domination because ideas 
themselves can, in a sense, be active and living. Verbeke looks at Newman’s Aristotelian 
tendencies and sees that for Newman, “knowledge is not an impersonal act, it bears an 
individual character: it is closely likned to the experience and practice of the knowing 
subject.”177 What marks real assent from notional is how personal it is—different people 
will give real assent to different things, based on their experience and expertise, while 
notional assent is impersonal enough that it only depends on the meaning of the words 
being understood.178  
II. THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGION 
Dulles notes that for Newman, a living idea is “an invisible principle that takes 
hold of the mind and becomes an active force leading to an ever-new contemplation of 
itself.”179 Ideas can come that strike an individual powerfully, and almost compel the 
person. In the movie A Beautiful Mind, John Nash is depicted as sitting in a bar talking 
with friends when he has a flash of inspiration leading to his theory of economics, and 
rushes out of the bar to put it on paper. This account is somewhat fictionalized, but the 
original “eureka” moment, which drove Archimedes to rush out of his tub naked 
proclaiming “eureka!” around the city of Athens, likewise illustrates the point—ideas can 
grab a person. Kant’s assertion that knowledge comes when the mind forces what is 
perceived into an idea was incomplete at best—sometimes an idea comes into the mind 
which forces the individual to do its bidding, and make it spread.  
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Most ideas will run their course and be modified—through paradigm shifts or 
other corrections, and few will grab hold of more than a few individuals. Wiles dedicated 
years to proving Fermat’s Last Theorem, but most people will not dedicate such time and 
effort to high-level mathematics. The ideas are very real for these great thinkers, but they 
are abstract and notional for the mass of humanity. Newman notes how the Duke of 
Wellington, the hero of Waterloo, wrote a letter on national defense. At the time he wrote 
it, the ideas were really apprehended by him (and perhaps other military experts) but only 
notionally among the general population until about 11 years later when another military 
crisis emerged and the nation realized the truth of Wellington’s words.180 The same may 
be said for theorems and ideas within physics or other disciplines—the experts have a 
vivid idea of how these concepts play out, but for most of us they are abstract concepts. 
The ideas are indeed living among those who specialize in them. But Christianity has 
been and must continue to be a living idea for a much larger group than professional 
theologians. When Newman thinks of the living idea of Christianity, he is thinking of 
something much vaster—spanning multiple centuries and cultures.  
Dulles sees that “Newman proposes a single cause, the image of Christ [….] His 
image, as the vivifying idea of Christianity, evokes […] the exemplary lives of the 
Christians, their longing for heaven, and their invincible adherence to their faith.”181 
Christianity is something which has captured the imaginations of humans for generations, 
giving them no less drive than Archimedes as he leapt from his bathtub. What will truly 
capture the person is a real apprehension, an experience of an idea that engages the whole 
person. For Christianity, the real apprehension that is at the heart of the living idea is an 
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apprehension of the person of Christ. Moreover, this apprehension is much more vivid 
and forceful than, say, an American’s apprehension of George Washington. There is 
always a difficulty in saying that one has a personal knowledge of an individual separated 
at least by time. Part of this difficulty is that this runs the risk of saying that only those 
who have the temperament to be true historians may have a full access to Jesus. While 
historical scholarship can enhance our knowledge of Scripture and therefore of Jesus, we 
again have the balance of wanting to affirm legitimate expertise with also affirming that 
the uneducated are likewise able to encounter Jesus. One need not be Aquinas to attain 
salvation. Newman argues against those who “speak of [Christianity] as if it were only a 
thing of history, with only indirect bearings upon modern times.”182 Christianity has 
historical roots, and this history is important, but Christianity is not only something that 
was, but something that is. Newman “cannot allow that it is a mere historical religion 
[…] we do not contemplate it in conclusions drawn from dumb documents and dead 
events.”183 Christianity continues to draw power and inspiration from its Source.  
The way in which we continue to encounter Jesus is through the sacraments. The 
sacraments—especially the Eucharist—carry the image and power of Jesus into the 
present day. Newman speaks of “rites and ordinances that are this very day” bringing the 
presence of Jesus into the Church.184 “First and above all” for Newman “is the Holy 
Mass, in which He who once died for us upon the Cross, brings back and perpetuates, by 
His literal presence in it, that one and the same sacrifice.”185 Newman’s idea has a long 
pedigree, and would later be reiterated by Vatican II, affirming that “by [Christ’s] power 
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He is present in the sacraments, so that when a man baptizes it is really Christ Himself 
who baptizes,” and that of all the ways Jesus is present in the sacraments, it is “most 
especially in the Eucharist.”186 There are other ways in which Jesus is made present and 
really apprehended by Christians, but for Newman it is chiefly in the sacramental and 
liturgical life of the Church. 
Fittingly for someone who is concerned with incarnate knowing, Newman sees 
the cause of the vivifying idea of Christianity as a concrete person, who is constantly 
made present to followers throughout history in concrete ways, and sees this bearing fruit 
in concrete effects. Newman sees Christianity as more than something historical, as noted 
above, but the testimony of history to Christianity is still quite powerful to him. Newman 
is amazed at the reality of “this central Image [of Christ] as the vivifying idea both of the 
Christian body and of individuals in it.”187 Newman spends roughly the next 20 pages 
looking at the examples of so many Christians, especially in the early Church, and how 
they were moved by the image of Jesus. By this time, Newman had already written his 
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, and explored how the living idea of 
Christianity had grown and matured over the years. Newman puts forward a 
“dynamically developing theory of doctrine” which includes a prophetic and an episcopal 
tradition.188 The prophetic tradition is unofficial and somewhat amorphous, and includes 
fables, customs, both sanctioned and “folk” practices.189 The episcopal tradition is official 
and relatively clear. It is handed from bishop to bishop and includes things such as 
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official statements. The episcopal tradition guides (and occasionally reins in) the 
prophetic tradition. This prophetic tradition shows clearly for Newman that Christianity is 
a living idea which takes hold of not just the educated, but “unlettered multitudes,” even 
in the midst of great persecution.190 Doctrine develops and is guided because people 
continue to ponder it over, and Christians act throughout history because their lives have 
been seized by this living idea.  
Dulles recalls that “Newman consistently taught that revelation primordially took 
the form of God’s action in history […] with facts and deeds that appraise us of the 
reality and the intentions of God.”191 What these actions in history show Newman is that 
the image of Jesus—the vital principle of Christianity—is able to move many, and not 
just an elite enlightened few (as with Gnosticism). History shows us that Christianity has 
continued to take hold of people of various times, places, and social groups, above all 
through the real apprehension of the person of Jesus.  
III. VITAL RELIGION THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
We can see this by a consideration of the tapestries in the Los Angeles cathedral. 
On these tapestries are a wide variety of saints, all positioned so that they face the main 
altar of the cathedral. There, one may see St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest minds 
in Christianity, and one may also see St. Juan Diego, who was illiterate. St. Joan of Arc, a 
great solider, has a place, as does St. John XXIII, who wrote an encyclical about peace on 
earth. There are kings, bishops, and scholars, there are peasants, hermits, and social 
workers. Within Catholicism, there are a wide variety of ways one can be a saint—there 
are even patron saints of butchers, bakers, and candle-stick makers (St. Anthony, St. 
                                                 
190 Newman, Grammar of Assent, 486 
191 Dulles, Newman, 69 
  76   
 
Elizabeth of Hungary, and St. Ambrose of Milan, respectively). Newman had a vivid 
grasp of history, and is greatly impressed by the variety of saints through the ages.  
Several things emerge from this panoply of saints. The first is that it impresses 
quite clearly how Christianity opens up a variety of choices in life. These choices are not 
infinite, to be sure, but few people would argue that every path in life is acceptable. In the 
first chapter, we saw how there was an emphasis on the multi-faceted nature of belief—
that accepting one thing did not mean that one had to rule out others. In the tapestry, the 
closing pages of Grammar of Assent, and the history of the Church in general, we may 
find a truly multi-faceted reality. Manning was clear how parents today (especially those 
who are not religiously affiliated) are very careful to not limit the life choices that their 
children might make. The breadth of saints is dizzying. The Catholic Church seems to 
grasp that providing concrete signs of how many ways there are to draw close to God in 
Christianity. During his pontificate, St. John Paul II canonized 482 saints, Benedict XVI 
another 45, and Francis has to date canonized 885. As we continue to promote the great 
many ways to become a saint—both through creating new saints as well as sharing their 
stories—we may help allay fears that to become Christian means to march in a lock-step 
with no variance. 
Moreover, Newman’s notion of development of doctrine throughout history gives 
a sense of how Christian belief is (to a certain degree) open-ended. Newman’s first 
sermon on development of doctrine is an expounding upon the line from Luke’s gospel 
that “Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart” (Lk. 2:19).192 This 
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action for Newman is at the heart of all doctrinal development. As Newman puts it, 
“Mary is our pattern of Faith, both in the reception and the study of divine truth. She does 
not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon it […] not enough to assent, she develops 
it.”193 We contemplate God’s actions in history, our experience of God through the 
sacraments, and the revelation which helps us make sense of it all, just as Mary 
contemplated and pondered the actions she witnessed as she presented Jesus in the 
Temple. Doctrines and their development are essentially the fruit of this pondering. Then, 
usually in response to a crisis or question, the doctrine will be articulated—as, for 
instance, with the Christological controversies of the early Church, which saw episcopal 
debates and conciliar definitions in response to questions that had finally reached a flash-
point.  
As history continues and new events occur, the Church ponders these doctrines in 
light of these new events (and vice-versa). Dulles rightly notes that “Newman opposes 
the ‘transformist’ view that Christianity is ever in flux and accommodates itself to the 
times.”194 Balancing this statement is his own observation that the “living idea” of 
Christianity “establishes itself by entering into relations, whether friendly or hostile, with 
the prevalent opinions, principles, and institutions in which it dwells.”195 Newman sees 
throughout history people continuing to ponder the ideas of Christianity, and while these 
ideas do not necessarily ape the ideas of the prevailing age, they do engage them. 
Sometimes, it will be positive (as with Aquinas “baptizing” Aristotle) and sometimes 
negative (as with Pope Francis denouncing the current “throw-away culture”). But this 
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development throughout history means that Christianity will always be in touch with the 
world, and perhaps more importantly means that the ideas of Christianity do not close off 
thought. Aquinas did not look at Aristotle’s texts, declare that anything valuable was 
already in Scripture, and walk away. Augustine did not simply declare Pelagius a heretic 
and refuse to answer—his reaction to Pelagianism helped develop the Church’s 
understanding of Original Sin.196 Newman sees within Christianity a living idea which 
can grow organically and lead to new insights and ideas. There is “a perceptible 
continuity between earlier and later forms of belief […] rooted in a common experience 
of the saving mystery of God.”197 Newman’s sense of history and doctrine shows clearly 
and concretely that the Idea of Christianity does not cut off thought. Quite the opposite—
it has provided grist for the mill for some 2000 years, with no sign of the mystery being 
exhausted. Christianity done badly is always possible, but Christianity done well is a 
constant pondering, an unending consideration over what we believe and Who we believe 
in. 
Moreover, Newman’s ideas of development of doctrine are an antidote to 
primitivism or archeologism. His sense of history makes it clear that the early Church (or 
the Medieval Church, or the Early Modern Church, or the contemporary Church) is not 
somehow purer or better than other eras. There is no one paradigmatic age of faith that all 
are measured against. Taylor opines that “perhaps there is no ‘golden age’ of 
Christianity.”198 On this, Newman would agree. As Daley has noted, Newman’s interest 
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in the Patristic Era was not that it was a better time to be Christian, but that in seeing the 
legitimate trajectory in the time immediately following the Apostolic Era, we may get a 
sense of what an appropriate trajectory for development and belief looks like in our own 
day. We see at the end of Grammar of Assent that Newman has a particular admiration 
for the early Church and the adversities it faced, but it does not follow from this that he 
thought the era was better.   
This, too, adds to the open-ended nature of Christianity, and increases its 
flexibility. We do not need to re-create Christendom in order to evangelize. The Church 
does not need to be persecuted as the early Christians were, nor does society need to be 
organized in quite the same way as Medieval Europe. Catholicism certainly has a body of 
social teaching, but so long as basic human rights and dignity are being respected, there is 
a remarkable versatility in what a “Christian society” (or a society in line with Christian 
values) should look like. Christian society can look like a modern liberal democracy—it 
could also look more like a feudal society, a tribal society, or a form of society that has 
not yet composed itself. Taylor sees religious practice as a process of composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition. Newman’s vision of Christianity and organic 
development of doctrine would not necessarily challenge this, and it would not require 
that everything held dear by contemporary individuals be scrapped. The type of world 
that Nones and others such as Manning wish to see can, in many respects, be affirmed by 
Christianity, and even what is disagreed with can be taken seriously. As we saw in the 
first chapter, much of what drives contemporary unbelief is not simply a rejection of 
Christian beliefs and virtues, but a positive holding of beliefs and virtues. If Christianity 
is to have anything to say to such people, it cannot dismiss their assertions out of hand, 
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but must take the time to engage with these assertions—be it through considered 
affirmation, thoughtful denial, or something in between. Newman sees Christianity as a 
living idea, and this serious engagement is part of that life.   
IV. REAL ASSENT AND PERSONALISM 
We have seen over the past few pages that Christianity is (or at least can be) a 
powerful and living idea, and that Newman’s Personalist turn and incarnate way of 
knowing enables this. Now we should take a moment to consider why this is, and what its 
implications for belief are. As we saw in the last chapter, the basic stances of the mind 
that Newman identifies are based on the basic kinds of statements we make—questions, 
unconditional assertions, and conditional assertions, indicating stances of doubt, assent, 
and inference, respectively. A living idea is going to have a life of its own, rather than 
being based upon a set of conditions, and so is most properly the subject of assent. At this 
point, it is likewise helpful to remember that with Newman’s attention to the knowing 
subject, an idea can garner one response from one person and a different one from 
another. Thus an agnostic might be in a state of doubt regarding God’s existence, while a 
theist would be in a state of assent. Or a proposition might be notionally assented to by 
one person while being really assented to by another—for that matter, one and the same 
person might pass from notional to real assent over the course of her life. The stances 
Newman enumerates reflect not only the object known (it is concrete or abstract) but how 
the subject knows it (it is experienced as concrete or abstract).  
Having already distinguished real and notional assent, we should see how they 
relate to each other, and how they can impact us. This is important because, as Crosby 
notes, while “the secret of [Newman’s] power is to convert notional apprehension into 
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real apprehension,” it is also true “that notional apprehension plays an important role of 
its own, and real apprehension is inconceivable apart from it.”199 We said earlier that 
Newman’s emphasis on the knowing subject was the difference between knowing as a 
spectator and knowing as a participant. With real assent, you are able to experience 
yourself as a participant in the reality you assent to as real. Crosby notes that “in notional 
apprehension, we pick out some aspect of a thing, or even several aspects of it, even 
though the full reality is vastly more than these aspects.”200 Newman himself uses the 
example of the geography of London—reading a map is notional apprehension, while 
knowing the streets yourself is real apprehension.201 A map picks out certain aspects—
orientation, particular landmarks, streets, perhaps buildings—while ignoring others. I can 
study a map of London fairly easily, see how the neighborhoods fit together, and navigate 
my way from Westminster to Wimbledon with accuracy. What I will miss with the map 
are the particular sights, smells, sounds, the heritage and history of the place, all the local 
color that walking the streets provides. With that, London is now real—much more than a 
map on the page of an atlas.  
There is certainly a usefulness in having a notional apprehension of something—
if I am trying to navigate the city for the first time, or trying to see how all the various 
parts fit together, a map is essential. Notional apprehension can situate real apprehension 
in a larger framework, and so help us tie everything together. Moreover, sometimes that 
distance is necessary, as so “notional apprehension is perfectly adapted to the surgeons 
who want to keep a distance from the grim reality of a disease” that they have to treat on 
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a regular basis.202 That professional distance can sometimes be helpful—you might not 
want a surgeon who weeps with compassion every time he cuts open a patient. But 
distance prevents any sort of loyalty or warm bond—it can prevent good things such as 
the formation of close friendships, and enable bad things such as lying or other malicious 
activities against another (it is much easier to wrong someone you do not care about).  
By contrast, real apprehension brings you into the thick of things. London is no 
longer controlled for distance and landmarks, but is the whole swirling experience. It is a 
place one can fall in love with (or hate passionately). The surgeon might maintain a 
professional, notional distance from my death, isolating it into certain clinical realities. 
But when I really apprehend and assent to the fact that I myself will die, “there is very 
much about my death that exceeds this limited respect.”203 Real apprehension and real 
assent put one into contact with an excess of meaning—there is more to the reality than 
one could ever take in with one sitting. Anything really apprehended can be 
overwhelming, or comforting, or disturbing, or joyful. When I have real apprehension of 
something, and give real assent to it, I take in as much of the thing as I am able, and 
apprehend and assent with my whole self.  
The recognition that there is more to a concrete reality than we will enumerate 
with exact precision is something that Newman sees, and it is a major part of 
contemporary belief today. Much of the conditions of belief that we explored in Chapter 
One revolve around the idea that reality is more complex than our formulas will allow. 
The rebellion of the Age of Authenticity against the “disciplined self” of earlier times, the 
attempt to maximize choices among human-created ideas of ultimate meaning, the 
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conviction that any true thing must spur on more thought rather than close off avenues of 
thinking—they all point to this reality. The real assent that Newman proposes is 
incarnate, because it allows (and even relies upon) the role of feeling in knowledge, and it 
does not lop off elements of reality that do not fit into neatly-defined logical categories. 
Real apprehension and assent takes into account the wholeness of the person and the 
complexity of the cosmos.  
We have said up to now that real assent is assent to something concrete or 
particular experienced as concrete or particular. However, it is important to note that 
“concrete” is not exactly the same as “sensible,” though the two fields may often overlap. 
Ker rightly points out that “real assent is not tied to the visual sense, or even sense 
experience at all.”204 In defense of this, Ker notes that “for Newman, the most important 
real assent a man is capable of is to the existence of God,” and that God is not something 
Newman (or most Christians) would regard as perceivable by the senses.205 Nor would 
pointing to the person of Jesus resolve the difficulty. Jesus is divine, and so does fully 
reveal God in sensible ways. However, the image of Jesus helps anchor our assent to 
revealed religion. The real assent to God that Newman thinks all people should make is 
not first and foremost a matter of revelation—it is part of what Newman classifies as 
natural religion.  
Newman holds that real assent and apprehension has to do with “things,” as 
opposed to “notions.” Newman contrasts real and notional assent by observing how 
“experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind, as abstractions and their 
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combinations do not.”206 We recognize something as real from our experience of it, or 
from having an image of it impressed on our mind. Note that Newman does not require a 
direct experience, and the image, while based on previously sensed objects, does not have 
to be directly derived from a sense perception. Newman fully allows that I can take 
images from other experiences and recombine them to form the image I really apprehend 
in the current case (an example he gives later in the Grammar is of tropical fruit, which 
few Britons at the time would have had personal sensory experience of). Personal sense 
experience is a major way of really apprehending and assenting to a thing—as I look at 
the desk in front of me, I am really apprehending it—but not the only way. 
Newman also holds that I may really apprehend God. While I would not do so 
through sense experience (not as we normally think of it, anyways), I can have an 
experience of God without being a full-fledged mystic. This is where conscience comes 
in. We had mentioned in the previous chapter that conscience is how Newman thinks one 
gains a personal experience of God. Expanding upon this for a moment, it is because of 
the emotions that we feel when conscience tells us we should not do something. Newman 
observes that “[inanimate] things cannot stir our affections; these are correlative with 
persons.”207 I act under the dictate of conscience as I would in the presence of a person 
and feel as I would feel in the presence of a person. Newman allows that other emotions 
may be stirred by non-personal beings (by an experience of art, for instance), but he sees 
these experiences as being weaker—he is making a clear distinction between intellectual 
pleasures and more powerful emotions.  
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Newman notes that “[what] is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on 
the mind which nothing abstract can rival. […] Because the object is more powerful 
therefore so is the apprehension of it.”208 Newman is beginning with an experience—we 
feel a strong imperative to do what (we think) is good, and feel corresponding shame 
when we do what (we think) is evil. Our emotions and experiences in conscience line up 
with the kind of emotions and experiences we only really have in the presence of a 
person—in this case, a person who is able to legitimately command or forbid behavior. 
Everything is consistent with the experience of a person who is a supreme lawgiver. 
From this experience, Newman reasons backward that what we are experiencing is God. 
What Newman is doing is not unlike what Aquinas does in working backwards from our 
experience of the fact that things exist, that things are caused, that they are contingent, 
etc. and from there deducing that there is a source for existence which is uncaused and 
not contingent. In both cases, because we are working backwards from an experience, the 
conclusion (God exists) is reasonable, but not inevitable.209 People have experiences of 
conscience and do not believe in God. But what Newman holds is that if we reflect on 
this experience, and consider what must be the case, we will see that we are experiencing 
God. The difference is that Aquinas’s Five Ways (and approaches like it) lead one to a 
notional assent—what Newman is aiming for is a real assent. With real assent, one can 
have certitude. In experiencing God as a felt reality, not just a logical deduction, one can 
moreover have a personal relationship with God. We experience God acutely not as a 
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general principle, but as a particular reality (namely, as Lawgiver), while also being well 
aware that there is much more to the reality than what we may experience at any one 
time.  
Newman’s emphasis on real assent continues in revealed religion, and it is this 
that he thinks grabs the minds and hearts of so many saints throughout the centuries. 
Newman was heavily influenced by the Alexandrian tradition, especially Athanasius.210 
Daley notes that “for Newman, the particular genius of the Alexandrian tradition was its 
unified vision of God’s mysterious but dynamic presence.”211 This presence makes itself 
known in the world through Scripture and human history, and reaches its apex “in the 
person of Christ […] and in Christ’s continuing, mysterious presence, though the Spirit, 
in the Church and the individual believer.”212 The way that God is presented in the 
Alexandrian tradition is something substantial, and potentially appealing to the 
contemporary person. The fact that God has a mysteriousness and a dynamism about Him 
makes God more real. Most humans have an experience of other humans as beings with a 
certain amount of depth, and who are generally on the move. This depth and activity is 
something we cannot control. If we can see how it is the case that God is likewise beyond 
our control, rather than something for us to coolly wrap our minds around like 
Pythagoras’ theorem, we may suddenly have a reason to care about God and assent to His 
existence. Moreover, not only identifying Christ as the culmination of God’s activity, but 
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the Church and individual believer as the locus of the Spirit’s activity in history after the 
Resurrection, we have concrete ways of experiencing the work of the Son.  
V. PERSONAL REVELATION, PERSONAL ASSENT, PERSONAL BELIEF 
Bouyer notes how Newman emphasizes that “it is as a person that God reveals 
Himself,” and that discovering God is “for Newman to recognize that that revelation is 
visible to us in His Son […] It amounts to accepting, not as abstract ideas but as vital 
truths, the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Redemption, themselves dominated by the 
revelation of the Trinity.”213 As with Athanasius, Newman will focus on the Person of the 
Son as the heart of divine revelation. The Son shows us God, and from this revelation we 
see the Trinity. In the realm of both natural and revealed religion, Newman sees a path 
for personal knowledge of God, and real assent—an assent that captures the whole 
person, so that a response to the reality apprehended can be a response of authenticity.  
At the same time, this authenticity is not something that begins and ends with the 
individual, but calls the individual to something external. Conscience is a voice that I 
hear in my depths, but quickly makes me aware of external realities and obligations. 
Personalism often distinguishes between “environment” and “world,” where environment 
is one’s immediate surroundings, especially “those things in my surroundings that 
promise to fulfill some need or that threaten to block the fulfillment of some need.”214 
World, on the other hand, is what lies beyond environment, and what is not just good-for-
me but good-in-itself. Levinas spoke of the experience of the face of the Other, and how 
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the face of the other makes us aware that this other person before me is not just 
something I may use, but which imposes obligations upon me.215 In the personal 
experience of God as Lawgiver, and the personal revelation of Jesus, we can have such 
an experience. We can be taken beyond ourselves and rooted more firmly in the world, 
and in the Source of the world. Especially because the dictates of conscience are heard 
within ourselves (but come from an external Source) the distinction between inner and 
outer worlds suddenly becomes less intense—the buffered self becomes a bit more 
porous.  
Newman is ultimately trying to bring about a personal relationship with God—to 
move from an “I-It” relationship to an “I-Thou” relationship with God. At the heart of 
Newman’s project is imagination. Crosby contrasts Newman’s use of the term “religious 
imagination” with “theological intellect,” and notes that “Newman often calls real assent 
‘imaginative’ assent.”216 As with Ker, Crosby notes that imagination and real assent 
“does not mean for Newman ‘visual image,’ it does not even mean ‘sensible image,” 
providing the example of imagining the mind of Augustine based on reading his works.217 
An image gives a sense of the whole individual—though by no means an exhaustive 
sense. These are the thoughts that capture both our minds and our hearts. The theological 
intellect can form the backdrop for the religious imagination and help us make sense of 
what we imagine, but it can never replace the religious imagination. We recalled at the 
start of the chapter the classic definition of theology as “faith seeking understanding.” 
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Theological reflection does not determine what we believe. Rather, it clarifies our beliefs 
and explains why we believe. Mary developed the ideas within her heart after assenting 
to them. According to Newman, doctrinal development in the Church occurs after we 
give assent, rather than before. Newman, being steeped in the Church Fathers, saw that 
we did not begin with the Nicene Creed or the Christological Councils, and then come up 
with a story about Jesus. Rather, our experience of and assent to the person of Jesus 
Christ, true God and true man, led us to reflect (and argue) over the meaning of this 
experience, and from there came the polished doctrinal and theological statements which 
inform and help us make sense of the person of Jesus.   
Newman’s Personalist turn has given him an expansive view of the knowing 
person as well as the cosmos (and God) that is known. On the one hand, Newman clearly 
has an appreciation for the individual person, as when he affirmed that “every one of all 
the millions who live or have lived, is as whole and independent a being in himself, as if 
there were no one else in the world but he.”218 Newman’s way of knowing reflects this, as 
when he holds that real assent and the illative sense is going to look slightly different for 
various people. Newman anticipates the perspectival emphasis of postmodern thought, 
and embraces individual distinction. Moreover, as we have seen in Newman’s 
appreciation of the various ways that saints have acted in history, he has an appreciation 
for individual creativity and action. He wishes for the image of Christ to seize each 
person’s imagination, and is basically open to a wide variety of responses. In his 
preaching, he is heavily influenced by his study of the Church Fathers—his fundamental 
concern is not to drill home a theological conclusion, but a religious foundation. Like 
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Athanasius, his focus is on putting the individual in touch with the person of Jesus. His 
motto “heart speaks to heart” is no mere platitude. As Newman said, “we do not affect 
people by telling them to weep or laugh.”219 We bring what moves us and show it to 
others, that they may be so moved.  
In evangelization, this means that we cannot simply tell people to feel joyful or 
ashamed—we must present to them an image that encourages joy or shame. Similarly, we 
cannot simply tell people that they ought to believe—we must present before them One 
who is worth believing. Abstract concepts and impersonal commands will not suffice. As 
we have seen, the whole reason for the emphasis on authenticity was a bristling against 
such impersonal (and limiting) commands. Moreover, if the act of belief is something 
that comes from a person’s own motivation, the concern that contemporary individuals 
(especially the Nones which Manning interviewed) might not be free in choosing could 
be assuaged. If heart speaks to heart, and an image is presented which captures the 
imagination and motivates the individual, the person can be said to be acting in freedom, 
to be acting in an authentic manner.  
What is presented to the individual above all is an image of God. In Grammar of 
Assent, Newman is convinced that the image of God impressed upon the individual by 
conscience is “the creative principle of religion.”220 It does not shut down thought or 
action, but opens up a new horizon. Newman wishes the person to act in freedom, 
motivated internally. And yet what motivates the person is not something that begins and 
ends within oneself. Newman recognizes that within the soul is an “infinite abyss of 
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existence”—a vast depth which gives the person dignity and individuality in the face of 
an equally vast cosmos.221 Yet Crosby notes that “for Newman the abyss of existence in 
each person awakens not in solitude but vis-à-vis the living God.”222 It is ultimately what 
is external to the individual that makes us aware of our interiority. The individual must be 
grounded in the cosmos, and in God. Now, we must draw our conclusions and sketch out 
how it is we may awaken the person to God, and so help them develop their inner 
openness to transcendence. We must ask how we can poke holes in the buffered self, and 
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Conclusion: Evangelization in the Contemporary World 
Up to this point, we have surveyed the contemporary West—its concerns, as well 
as the conditions of belief people have in society—by way of Taylor. We have likewise 
examined Newman’s thoughts on knowing and believing, as well as the writings of his 
contemporary interpreters (especially Crosby), seeing his incarnate way of knowing and 
his personal way of transmitting belief. What we will do in this brief concluding section 
is highlight some of the key findings in this survey, and then draw from Newman’s own 
example in proposing a few ideas for evangelization in the contemporary world. 
Among the elements that characterize conditions for belief in the present age are a 
longing for depth and a desire for authenticity. The emphasis on individualism and free 
choice largely emerges from these desires. Within the Immanent Frame, there is a 
tendency to see things as good-for-me (or, perhaps good-for-us) rather than good-in-
themselves. As part of the shift to an Immanent Frame, Taylor sees a “striking 
anthropocentric shift” in how the world is perceived starting in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
though the groundwork is laid in the late Middle Ages.223 By contrast, pre-moderns such 
as Aquinas would see the diversity of creation as being the best way to reflect God’s vast 
goodness—a theocentric view.224 As noted in Chapter One, the general habit of thinking 
has become increasingly utilitarian—or “environment-bound” as Personalists describe it.  
Because depth and authenticity are such a part of the current age, for someone to 
believe something, it needs to have the ring of profundity to it, and to somehow engage 
the person at the very level of identity. In some ways, past is prologue—humans have 
always desired greater and greater experience of reality, and to have some certitude about 
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their beliefs. What is notable here is first that the desire for depth in understanding has 
gone from the outer world to the inner world. Moreover, there is a conviction that the 
dispassionate reason of the Enlightenment is unable to describe the inner life of the 
human person, which can lead to a perceived dichotomy of external authority vs. internal 
authenticity, as seen with the Romantic movement. On this view, structures imposed or 
reasons given are confining, fail to see the totality of the person, and therefore fail to 
assist in the flourishing of the full person. Moreover, we saw in Chapter Two that this 
view is not without warrant, given the trend of excarnate reason that has been ongoing at 
least since the Enlightenment.  
Putting these trends together—the suspicion of dispassionate reason and external 
authority on the one hand, and the desire for depth and authenticity on the other, the only 
way to communicate belief is through personal witness. Pope Francis has encouraged this 
in Evangelii Gaudium, when he sees as the first way of sharing the Gospel “personal 
dialogue, where the other person speaks and shares his or her joys, hopes and concerns 
for loved ones, or so many other heartfelt needs.”225 Newman had a sense of this in his 
own time, when considering how to deal with the anti-Catholic prejudice still prevalent in 
England. Personal encounter was the only viable method Newman saw, admonishing 
others that out-arguing the others would ultimately be a vain effort. As Newman 
observed, “the great instrument of propagating moral truth is personal knowledge.”226 
Likewise in education Newman held that “no book can convey the special spirit and 
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delicate peculiarities of its subject with that rapidity and certainty which attend on the 
sympathy of mind with mind, through the eyes, the look, the accent, and the manner.”227 
Crosby sees in both of these statements a foreshadowing of the way of knowing he would 
later develop in Grammar of Assent, where “in our reasonings in concrete matters our 
minds work with for more strands of thought than can be formulated in propositions.”228 
A century before Levinas, Newman recognizes what the face of a person can do in 
making me aware of my responsibilities to the other. Unlike Levinas, Newman not only 
recognizes how the face can stop me from exerting my own will, but how it can make 
two minds unite.  
What this means first of all is the importance of personal encounter in 
evangelization. Few things will convince an individual that Christianity is at least 
plausible more than a person living the Christian life well. By contrast, few things will 
turn an individual away from Christianity quite so completely as one who claims to be 
Christian but who fails to live in a Christian manner. Christopher Hitchens recalls the 
dour manner in which people conducted themselves at services he attended and posed “a 
sincere question. Why does such a belief not make its adherents happy?”229 There are, as 
Pope Francis put it, “Christians whose lives seem like Lent without Easter.”230 No one 
person, of course, can model Christianity perfectly. First, this need not be an obstacle for 
anyone. Francis’s image of the Church as “field hospital” is a captivating one. Even in 
secular society, the image of the imperfect person who is nonetheless striving for holiness 
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can be powerful—as with Jules’s declaration of conversion at the end of Pulp Fiction 
“I’m trying real hard to be the shepherd.”231  Honesty about imperfection can encourage 
individuals that they, too, have a place in the Church.232 In an age marked by authenticity, 
being honest about one’s shortfalls can be taken as a sign of authenticity, and therefore be 
compelling. 
 Moreover, our imperfections and limitations in completely showing the Christian 
life is partly why we have such a wide variety of saints to draw upon. As we noted in 
Chapter Three, there are a variety of saints to draw upon, some more or less captivating 
or relevant to a given person. All of them, however, embody in some way the Christian 
life and show what it means to live virtuously. Christianity and morality are no longer 
abstract concepts or unattainable goals, but something livable.233 In keeping with the 
incarnate thrust of Newman’s way of knowing (and of Christianity in general), pointing 
to incarnate examples of Christian living may be more appropriate and effective than 
arguing for the logical coherence of a moral precept.234 
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Of course, more than the saints, the image of Jesus can captivate the imagination. 
Pope Benedict observed at the start of Deus Caritas Est that “[being] Christian is not the 
result of an ethical choice or lofty idea, but the encounter with an event, a person, which 
gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction.”235 Benedict, like Newman, has a strong 
background in Patristics, and so is attentive to how the Church Fathers deployed 
images—and above all the image of the Person of Jesus—in order to cultivate belief in 
their listeners. As St. John Paul II noted, “Jesus is the human face of God.”236 As God 
Incarnate, Jesus is able to show us God in terms we can understand—to encounter Jesus 
is to encounter God.  
For Newman, not only Jesus, but the Trinity was a favorite way to show God. 
Crosby notes that “in some of [Newman’s] sermons preached for Trinity Sunday he takes 
delight in the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity concerns not only the economy of our 
salvation, but also, and first of all, God.”237 Newman indeed makes particular note of this, 
and Crosby sees this as a sign of what he calls Newman’s “theocentric religion.”238 In 
encountering the face of Jesus, we encounter the face of an Other, a Person who does not 
just exist for me, but has an inherently valuable existence. In the case of Jesus, we are 
forced to acknowledge this of God, as well. The Trinity takes this reality and amplifies it. 
The face of the person shows us clearly that there is a reality beyond our own needs and 
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desires (and so there is more to the universe than what is useful for me). The face of the 
person confronts us with mystery.  
Likewise, the Trinity confronts us with mystery, and even adds to the reality of 
God.  Newman urges his listeners to “[let] a man consider how hardly he is able and how 
circuitously he is forced to describe the commonest objects of nature,” and it will be even 
less surprising that we are able to exhaust the realities of the Trinity in our speech.239 In 
the introduction, we noted that concern with depth was characteristic of the present age, 
and evidence of depth aids in contemporary belief. When Levinas famously reflected on 
the moral significance of the face, he noted that when we are confronted with the face, we 
are confronted with a depth and an alterity that our minds cannot fully penetrate, and so 
we must respect the alterity of this other person. In a sense, to be confronted with the 
Trinity is to be confronted with the face of God, and to be confronted by God’s depth and 
alterity.  
Whenever we speak of the Trinity, there is going to be a certain mysteriousness 
and incomprehension. For the preacher, this is perhaps the greatest cause of fear. But 
Newman showed in his own sermons how this can be turned into a great advantage. In 
confronting believers with the Trinity’s mysteriousness (without lapsing into utter 
incoherence), we can confront them with God’s alterity and depth. The mystery of the 
Trinity can be a powerful refutation of Feuerbach’s charge that God is a human 
invention. Presenting the image of Jesus and the reality of the Trinity as Newman did 
may help to shift the anthropocentric shift Taylor has noted back in a theocentric 
direction. In seeing how beyond us God is, the mystery of the Trinity may shift the 
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conditions of belief somewhat, as believers begin to realize that religion is more than a 
matter of identity and authenticity, but rendering what is due to God.  
Moreover, as we are challenged in our experience of God, to treat God as “Thou” 
and not “It,” we may likewise be challenged as we consider our experience of creation. 
Our experience of existence is one of dependency and contingency—nothing around us 
simply must exist, but has an origin. As we experience our own dependence of God, we 
may perhaps also come to realize that the creation around us has a dependence on God, 
and so has a purpose given to it by God, independent of our own desires. This is arguably 
the point that Pope Francis is trying to make in Laudato si as he urges us to think of 
creation more as a sister to be loved and less as a mechanical system to be dominated.  
For Newman, like Athanasius and other Fathers, it is the Son who shows us the 
Trinity. The terms which the Son gives to us are powerful terms which help us get at the 
heart of the matter. Newman notes that the “words Father, Son, Spirit, He, One, and the 
rest, are not abstract terms, but concrete, and adapted to excite images.”240 These images 
dwell within the various propositions of the creeds and give them their peculiar force. 
Athanasius and Newman both had a keen sense of how to deploy imagery to help capture 
the minds and hearts of believers. Principally, these images are drawn from Scripture. 
Other images may be used, but care should be taken in those instances that they do not 
run afoul of Biblical language, and especially the images and language of Jesus. There is 
real assent possible with the Trinity. The images that Scripture and the great creeds 
provide allow this real assent, which in turn makes true devotion possible. As we present 
the mystery of the Trinity (or any other Christian mystery), we should never be afraid of 
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providing things that are only notional assent, any more than we would be afraid of 
giving a visitor a map of London. These things help organize the experiences and tie 
them together. But we should always be sure and provide images that can be the object of 
real assent, what Newman saw as the heart of vital religion.  
In addition to images and the Scriptures, we likewise have the rites and the 
Sacraments. Newman recognized how the Incarnation marked a revolution in how we can 
know God. Newman also sees how the Sacraments continue the life of Christ, and so 
continue our ability to know the Triune God throughout history. The liturgical year gives 
us a vast treasure of rites and occasions to pause and reflect on one or another aspect of 
our faith. The Sacraments provide us with concrete symbols that we can latch onto. The 
readings from Scripture provide images that can awaken a real apprehension of a 
mystery, as well as concepts that can situate us with a notional apprehension—and 
liturgies provide an opportunity for preaching where a person can weave the two together 
in a way most suited to the congregation at hand. There are saints and festivals 
surrounding holy people and occasions that remind us of our great heritage spanning 
centuries and continents—a humble reminder that while history certainly matters, there is 
no one perfect Christian era or golden age. The age we live in now may be an age for 
belief, if we take the opportunity to discern how people find things credible, and how to 
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